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ABSTRACT
Recent interest in increasing recycling rates has emerged in response to concerns over
greenhouse gas emissions externalities from energy-intensive manufacturing processes. This
dissertation evaluates recycling policies and how material life-cycle externalities considera-
tions contribute to policy justification. The analysis provides new evidence on the social
benefits from recycling and the policies that will maximize these benefits.
First, we analyze how upstream production externalities affect least-cost policies for
waste reduction. The effect of a deposit/refund, advance disposal fees, and recycling
subsidies on upstream greenhouse gas emissions is examined. The analysis finds that the
benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are of the same order as or larger than the
benefits of reducing solid waste disposal, implying larger optimal total waste reductions than
previous studies. Furthermore, the least-cost intervention levels will be material-specific and
vary substantially across materials. Finally, despite the reductions in emissions implied
by increased recycling rates, direct recycling subsidies are more costly and generate less
emissions reductions than a deposit/refund or advance disposal fee.
Next, we examine how the existence of upstream production externalities and downstream
disposal externalities will affect the optimal recycling rate of specific common consumer
goods. We analyze whether recycling all common household items provides external benefits
that justify policy intervention, or whether such benefits are only generated for specific
materials. For materials with low quantities of greenhouse gas emissions from production
activity - such as newspapers, paperboard, glass, and plastics - little change to the observed
recycling rates is justified. By contrast, significant increases in recycling rates are justified for
steel, aluminum and office papers, whose production process requirements are more energy,
and thus emissions, intensive. The results indicate that policies which encourage recycling
of the aggregate waste stream are significantly less justified than policies which focus on
iii
increasing recycling of key target materials.
Lastly, we analyze whether single stream curbside recycling programs increase recycling
of municipal solid waste. Such programs tend to encourage recycling by consumers, while
also increasing contamination of material streams. High contamination rates contribute to
larger quantities of uneconomic or unrecoverable material that is ultimately disposed of in
landfills, negating the benefits of recycling. Thus, we use cross sectional data to empiri-
cally estimate the trade-offs of increasing diversion of materials at the expense of increased
contamination with single stream programs. Ultimately, regression results suggest that
conversion from multi to single stream curbside recycling programs does have a net posi-
tive effect on increasing recycling. This positive relationship, however, may be overstated
significantly in instances when contamination is not accounted for. In particular, there are
two mechanisms by which contamination reduces the amount of material recycled. Decom-
posing these effects shows that single stream implementation can lead to a reduction in the
quantity of material recycled in communities with pre-existing high diversion rates.
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Recycling rates of total municipal solid waste in the United States have increased from
7% in 1970 to 34% in 2010 according to the U.S. EPA (2011). A combination of cultural
and legislative factors, such as increased education, expanded access to recycling facilities,
and implementation of incentive-based programs such as bottle bills, have encouraged this
growth in national recycling participation. Yet, the U.S. is still falling behind many other
developed nations which boast significantly higher rates of recycling and diversion of waste
from landfills. As such, many government municipalities are increasingly adopting policies
to raise waste reduction and recycling rates.
Historically, recycling policies such as product taxes, recycling subsidies, or combined
deposit/refunds have been used as a means to reduce waste. Recently, in response to growing
awareness over climate change, these recycling policies have become possible mechanisms to
address energy - and thus greenhouse gas emissions - concerns. This dissertation directly
reflects this second wave of interest in recycling policy, specifically, examining waste and
recycling policies when upstream emissions are accounted for. In economic terms, these
greenhouse gas emissions produce negative spillovers which are referred to as externalities
since they generate external costs to society. As such, in the absence of policy, markets
fail to acknowledge these unpriced costs. In a broader sense, the results presented may
assist policymakers to better understand how reductions in such external costs - which are
ultimately benefits - are generated with recycling policies.
First, Chapter 2 examines least-cost policies for waste reduction, incorporating upstream
greenhouse gas considerations associated with the production of consumption goods from
various materials. In particular, the effect of a deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and
recycling subsidy on upstream greenhouse gas emissions is decomposed. The analysis finds
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that the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are of the same order as or larger than
the benefits of reducing solid waste disposal, implying a larger justification for reducing waste
than in previous studies. Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies, the least-cost waste
reduction policy will be material-specific and vary substantially across materials. Finally,
despite the reductions in emissions implied by increased recycling rates, direct recycling
subsidies are more costly and generate less emissions reductions than a deposit/refund or
advance disposal fee. An excerpt of this research is published as Acuff and Kaffine (2012).
Next, Chapter 3 examines the optimal recycling rates for various household products. The
analysis accounts for both the upstream and downstream benefits from recycling different
materials to address whether policy is justified for all materials. As governments continue to
adopt different policies to raise recycling rates, it becomes increasingly important to define
the objectives of such policies. Theoretically, implementation of these policies implies that a
wedge exists between the current observed rate and what is optimal from a social perspective.
Thus, several key questions emerge: what is the optimal recycling rate, how does it differ
from what is observed, and how does this rate vary across materials? The observed recycling
rate will depend on material-specific conditions in the private market for recycled material.
Specifically, how responsive the demand for recycled material is to the materials’ scrap
price will determine the recycling rate in the absence of policy influence. By contrast, the
optimal recycling rate will depend on the change in the external damages from production
and disposal of each material. For materials with low quantities of greenhouse gas emissions
from production activity - such as newspapers, paperboard, glass, and plastics - little change
to the observed recycling rates is justified. By contrast, significant increases in recycling rates
are justified for steel, aluminum and office papers, whose production process requirements are
more energy, and thus emissions, intensive. Ultimately, the results indicate that governments
should avoid policies that encourage recycling of the aggregate waste stream and instead focus
on increasing recycling of target materials.
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Lastly, Chapter 4 examines the benefits of recycling programs that lack material-specific
goals. Single stream curbside program presence is on the rise in the U.S., increasing two-fold
in the last ten years. These recycling programs offer a convenient method for households to
participate in municipal recycling and as a result, it is thought that such programs signifi-
cantly increase the quantity of waste diverted from landfills. Unfortunately, highly convenient
single stream curbside programs tend to result in higher contamination rates within the di-
verted material streams. Highly contaminated diverted materials require costly separation
and cleaning activities at the processing facility and as a result, these diverted material
streams often result in either down-cycled low grade material or uneconomic material that is
discarded in landfills. This raises the question - are single stream recycling programs benefi-
cial? The results suggest that single stream programs have a significant positive impact on
diversion quantities. However, the effect of single stream programs on the quantity actually
recycled, after accounting for contamination, is positive but roughly only half the magnitude
of the effect on diversion quantities. Ultimately, the analysis shows that conversion from
multi to single stream curbside recycling programs can increase the external benefits from
recycling, however, these benefits may be overstated dramatically if reported quantities di-
verted fail to account for contamination. In addition, in instances where diversion rates are
already high, we find that program conversion can lead to reductions in recycling, owing to
the fact that at these quantities, the negative contamination effect will outweigh the positive
diversion effect.
To conclude, Chapter 5 provides a general discussion on the results of all three studies.
Following these results, policy recommendations are provided. Policymakers can increase
the net social benefits of waste reduction and recycling policies by considering the following.
Upstream externalities from greenhouse gas emissions are an important component to weigh-
ing the benefits provided by recycling. In addition, a material-specific analysis is required to
capture the material-specific characteristics of the recycling market as well as the external
production and disposal damages associated with each material type. Lastly, programs that
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do not have material-specific targets, such as single stream curbside programs, may not add
substantial positive external benefits in comparison to alternate program implementation in
a community. Not only do these programs fail to target key materials for recycling, but
they increase the contamination of the diverted waste stream, potentially detracting from
the total amount of material recycled.
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CHAPTER 2
LEAST-COST RECYCLING POLICIES WITH UPSTREAM GREENHOUSE GAS
CONSIDERATIONS
The era of contemporary household recycling began in 1987 following the voyage of the
garbage barge Mobro 4000, whose story sparked a surge of interest in waste reduction within
the United States. The infamous barge was loaded with trash, and for two months it roamed
the Atlantic Coast as far south as Belize, searching for a port to dock and unload its cargo.
By the time it returned to Long Island, still carrying a full load of garbage, the barge
had made national news headlines. Nicknamed the “Gar-barge” by the media, it gained
the attention of the public who viewed its fate as an indicator of a looming trash crisis
due to insufficient landfill space.1 In addition, images of medical waste and oozing trash
aboard the barge led to rising concerns over hazardous waste and the resulting damage to
health and the environment. In response, between 1990 and 2000, recycling programs grew
tenfold, increasing the number of households with access to curbside recycling to over half
and achieving an overall recovery rate near one-third of total municipal solid waste.
However, consumer interest regarding recycling and waste disposal waned in the years to
follow (Katz, 2002). Several mechanisms drove this decline in interest in the aftermath of
the “trash crisis.” First, land was not as scarce as the story of the Mobro 4000 suggested.
Although the number of landfills decreased between 1988 and 1997, the actual landfill ca-
pacity grew during this time (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2001). In addition, Benjamin (2010)
notes that disposal techniques have improved and leakage has declined, somewhat mitigat-
ing concerns of potential contamination from hazardous material. The decline in recycling
interest may have also been driven by the recognition that the social costs of disposal are
1The Mobro was originally intended to undergo an experimental program in North Carolina to convert
trash into methane. It was rejected by authorities there and the fate of the Mobro 4000 had more to do
with poor business planning and concerns about mob connections and hazardous waste than with space
constraints for waste disposal.
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relatively small. Palmer et al. (1997) use a value of $33 per ton as the social cost of waste
disposal, justifying a modest policy intervention to achieve a 7.5% reduction in total waste.
More recently, Kinnaman (2006) provides a calculation of social costs of waste disposal at
$5-$9 per ton, noting that many costs associated with waste disposal are internalized by
landfills via tipping and host fees. At this social cost of waste disposal, extremely small total
waste reductions of 1% or less would be justified.2
A renewed interest in recycling has emerged more than 20 years after the story of the
Gar-barge, not in response to the social cost of waste disposal, looming landfill constraints,
or contamination concerns, but rather from growing concerns over upstream greenhouse
gas emissions associated with production of consumer goods. Specifically, the fact that
production of goods from recycled inputs is typically less emissions intensive than production
from virgin inputs has led to calls for increased recycling to reduce this upstream externality.3
However, both Palmer et al. (1997) and Kinnaman (2006) note that upstream externalities
such as greenhouse gas emissions would be more efficiently handled via policy interventions
at their source, rather than adjusting waste and recycling policies. Walls and Palmer (2001)
show that in a world where Pigovian instruments are available, the optimal policy is to
set a tax equal to the marginal social damage of the upstream externality coupled with a
downstream deposit/refund set equal to the marginal social damage of waste disposal.
However, in the United States it is unlikely that a carbon pricing scheme will be imple-
mented in the near future. When Pigovian taxes are infeasible, Walls and Palmer (2001)
show that the setting of alternative instruments could benefit from using life cycle assessment
(LCA) information regarding upstream greenhouse gas emissions associated with a product’s
life.4 In such a case, the downstream waste and recycling policy should be adjusted to ac-
2Kinnaman (2006) notes that most of the benefits from recycling are primarily “warm-glow” utility
received by recyclers.
3For example, aluminum production from recycled inputs uses only 5% of the energy required for the
production of virgin material.
4Life cycle assessments are becoming a common technique to compare materials by evaluating the en-
vironmental performance of goods by accounting for all upstream energy and material input required in its
production process, as well as quantifying the impact of disposal, degree of recyclability, and a measure of
the functionality of the good.
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count for the upstream emissions externality, reflecting the fact that waste and recycling
policy will alter the quantity and mix of recycled and virgin inputs used in production. Fol-
lowing this logic, we re-evaluate market-based waste reduction and recycling policies in the
presence of unpriced greenhouse gas emissions.
Several questions are addressed in this analysis. First, what are the channels of adjust-
ment that lead to emission savings and how do emissions savings vary across waste and
recycling policies? How does this variation in emission savings affect the relative cost of al-
ternative waste and recycling policies and what are the implications for policy design? Next,
how do the social benefits from reduced emissions compare to the social benefits of reduced
waste disposal? Lastly, given substantial heterogeneity in the emissions released during the
production of varying types of consumer goods, how much would material-specific policy
interventions reduce the cost of waste and recycling policies?
This paper extends the simulation analysis presented in Palmer et al. (1997) (hereafter
PSW) which determines the least-cost policies for reducing municipal solid waste when a
unit pricing, “pay-as-you-throw” system is not feasible.5 Their numerical results confirm
prior theoretical and empirical studies that conclude that a deposit-refund is the most effi-
cient policy instrument for reducing waste Dinan (1993); Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995);
Sigman (1995); Palmer and Walls (1997).6 The intuitive explanation for this result is that
deposit/refunds exploit both channels of waste reduction by decreasing consumption and
promoting recycling of goods. While these studies on downstream waste disposal ignore
upstream considerations, Walls and Palmer (2001) provide a theoretical framework in which
5Most households experience a flat fee for waste disposal, although it has been shown that a unit-
based charge on waste, either by weight or volume is the most efficient policy to reduce total residential
waste Jenkins (1993). When households are charged the appropriate nonzero marginal cost per unit waste,
the social cost of waste is properly internalized Kinnaman (2006). In response to the fee, households can
voluntarily elect to reduce consumption or increase recycling to avoid additional charges. However, Fullerton
and Kinnaman (1996) show that this only holds in the absence of illegal disposal. Ino (2011) revisits the
illegal disposal issue from the perspective of firm-level decisions, and derives the second-best deposit/refund
policy in the presence of monitoring costs.
6Several additional empirical studies examine the effectiveness and consequences of various waste and
recycling policies “in the field” Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996); Jenkins et al. (2003); Yang and Innes
(2007); Beatty et al. (2007); Ashenmiller (2009). See Kinnaman (2006) for a summary of recycling benefits
and empirical findings of unit-based pricing.
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they incorporate upstream externalities associated with the production of consumer goods.
Building off this theoretical framework, our study “closes the loop” in the numerical par-
tial equilibrium model provided by PSW to incorporate greenhouse gas emissions from the
production of consumer goods using virgin and recycled material inputs. The simulation
analysis calculates the costs of policies to achieve a given reduction in waste, net the benefits
of emissions reduction for three policy tools: deposit/refund, advance disposal fees (ADF),
and direct recycling subsidies. Calibrated to the PSW model, we directly compare results
to identify potential benefits and policy implications as a consequence of accounting for
greenhouse gas emissions in upstream production activities.
We find several important results with strong policy implications. First, analytical de-
compositions of the effect of deposit/refund, advance disposal fees, and recycling subsidies
on greenhouse gas emissions highlight two channels through which these policies affect emis-
sions: source reduction and increased recycling. The source reduction channel occurs as a
result of a deposit or ADF increasing the price of the final good and causing consumers to
reduce consumption. The increased recycling channel occurs as consumers have a greater
incentive to recycle in the presence of a refund or subsidy. We note that the source reduction
will generally have a larger impact on emissions as reduced consumption eliminates emis-
sions entirely, while increased recycling only reduces emissions corresponding to the difference
between virgin and recycled production emissions.7 From the perspective of emissions reduc-
tions, the advance disposal fee provides the largest benefits at $40 per ton of waste reduction,
as it operates solely via the source reduction channel. Thus, while the advance disposal fee
is more costly than the deposit/refund from the perspective of waste reduction, for waste
reductions less than 4% the ADF is the least-cost policy due to the benefits of avoided
emissions. Beyond that level of waste reduction, the deposit/refund is the least-cost policy.
Finally, despite the fact that production of consumer goods from recycled material is less
7According to the EPA’s hierarchy of integrated solid waste management methods, source reduction
takes priority over increased recycling. However, PSW argue that an optimal combination of both methods
provides the greatest efficiency in achieving waste disposal reduction. PSW do note that the EPA’s hierarchy
may be more appropriate when considering upstream production externalities, such as in this study.
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emissions-intensive, the direct recycling subsidy provides the least emission savings and has
the highest cost of achieving a given waste reduction. This result may assist policymakers
to avoid mistakenly adopting recycling subsidies over less costly policy instruments.
We find that at $25 per MTCO2-equivalent price of carbon, the social benefits from
reduced greenhouse gas emissions are of the same order of magnitude as the marginal social
damage of waste disposal in PSW, and substantially larger than the marginal social damage
of waste disposal in Kinnaman (2006).8 While a 7.5% reduction in waste is justified by
the $33 per ton social cost of waste disposal from Palmer et al. (1997), a 14% reduction in
waste is justified when the benefits of emissions reductions are incorporated. At the social
cost of waste disposal of $5-$9 per ton reported by Kinnaman (2006) a negligible policy
intervention is justified; however, when the benefits of emissions reductions are accounted
for, an 8% reduction in waste is now justified. Furthermore, for a 10% reduction in waste,
PSW find that the least cost policy is a deposit/refund of $45 per ton, while incorporating
the benefits of emissions reductions lowers the cost to $19 per ton for the same reduction in
waste.
Finally, we find that a material-specific intervention level reduces the cost of achieving
a given reduction in waste by 10%. The intuitive explanation behind this is that while the
benefits of waste reduction are homogeneous across material types, greenhouse gas emissions
vary substantially by material type and input source. Thus, the deposit/refund levied per
ton of aluminum is more than an order of magnitude larger than the deposit/refund per ton
of glass and paper, reflecting the emissions benefits of reducing aluminum production from
virgin inputs.
8We provide discussion and sensitivity analysis of alternative assumptions regarding the marginal social
damage of greenhouse gas emissions. Also, it should be noted that our analysis abstracts from other exter-
nalities resulting from the production of consumer goods, such as forestry and land use issues associated with
paper production, other local emissions associated with energy production, or mining externalities generated
by the production of aluminum and steel.
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2.1 Model
The model adopted in this paper builds on that developed by PSW, using their 1990 data
on baseline prices, consumption, and recycling by material, as well as own-price elasticities for
demand and supply in the consumption and recycling markets.9 We begin with a description
of the analytical model used in PSW, which is then augmented to incorporate greenhouse
gas emissions from virgin and recycled production.
2.1.1 Model of waste and recycling
The basic equilibrium mass-balance model is described by the following system of equa-
tions:
W = Q−R, (2.1)
Q = D(pq, pq − pr), (2.2)
Rd(pr) = r(pr)D(pq, pq − pr), (2.3)
where W is disposed waste, Q is total consumption, and R is the amount recycled. The
mass balance equation 2.1 requires that all consumption is either disposed of as waste, or
is recycled. Consistent with PSW, supply of the final product Q is assumed to be perfectly
elastic, while demand D for the final product Q varies with the price of the final product pq
and, if recycled, with the price net of scrap value pq − pr as in equation 2.2.10 The supply
of recycled material varies with the scrap price (pr) and is equal to the recycling rate r(pr)
times total consumption. Finally, demand for recycled material is assumed to also vary with
pr, such that R
d = Rd(pr). Equation 2.3 states that the market for recycled scrap clears at











9Using the identical 1990 dataset allows for easy comparison with previous results, ensuring that differ-
ences in results are driven solely by inclusion of greenhouse gas externalities, and not differences in parameter
assumptions. See Tables I and II in Palmer et al. (1997).
10There may also be a marginal effort cost or marginal psychic benefit associated with recycling the good,
but as in PSW, we abstract from such considerations. Nonetheless, the psychic benefits, ”warm-glow”,
associated with recycling may be an important feature of recycling, as argued in Kinnaman (2006).
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Several assumptions of the original study should be noted. It is assumed that markets
for the final material and recycled material are perfectly competitive. It is also assumed
that there are no lags between when the material is purchased and when it is disposed of
or recycled. Another important assumption is that the quantity of the consumption good Q
does not affect the demand for recycled materials Rd(pr). The final important assumption
is that demand for the consumption good only depends on own price, effectively setting
the cross-price elasticity across materials equal to zero. Realistically, increases in the price
of glass would likely lead towards substitution towards aluminum. While relaxing these
assumptions would alter the quantitative results in PSW and this study, they are unlikely
to alter the qualitative comparisons between the two studies.
2.1.2 Incorporating greenhouse gas externalities
To this basic set-up, we add the CO2-equivalent emissions associated with the production
of the consumption good Q. Walls and Palmer (2001) develop a framework incorporating
upstream production into the waste and recycling model in PSW, which we will draw upon.
We adopt a similar mass-balance expression V +R = Q which states that production output
must come from either virgin inputs V or recycled inputs R.11 In other words, in a static
model, if 30% of consumption is recycled, it implies that 30% of production comes from
recycled material, with the remainder produced from virgin materials.12 Note that this also
implies that W = V , such that waste disposed of by consumers is equivalent to the amount of
virgin inputs required in the production process. Distinguishing between virgin and recycled
inputs is extremely important when considering upstream externalities, as CO2-equivalent
emissions from production vary depending on whether virgin or recycled materials are used.
11The theoretical model in Walls and Palmer (2001) also allow for manufacturing by-products (non-
consumer solid waste), a consideration abstracted from in this study.
12For certain materials, this strict 1:1 substitutability between virgin and recycled inputs may not precisely
hold, and more than one ton of recycled input may be needed to replace one ton of virgin input. For example,
1.1 tons of recycled aluminum is required to replace 1 ton of virgin aluminum, as some material is lost when
melting down the recycled scrap. This would diminish the benefits of recycling relative to the results
presented.
11
Emissions are thus given by:
E = δvV + δrR (2.4)
where δv transforms production of goods from virgin materials into emissions and δr trans-
forms recycled production into emissions.




Writing and printing (office) 0.99 1.36
Paperboard (cardboard) 0.84 0.92
Other 1.98 0.92
Glass




Other containers 12.94 0.95
Durables and misc. nondurable 12.94 0.95
Steel
Cans 2.82 0.99





Other nondurables 1.76 0.18
Durables 2.16 0.18
Note: Values obtained from “Solid Waste Management and Greenhouse Gases: A Life-Cycle
Assessment of Emissions and Sinks” EPA (2006). See the appendix for more information regarding
data. Values for aluminum and steel were not differentiated by type.
In addition to the fact that emissions vary depending on the use of virgin versus recycled
inputs, greenhouse gas emissions also vary considerably by material, as shown in Table 2.1.
The values in Table 2.1 were obtained from an EPA life-cycle assessment of emissions as-
sociated with production. Note that these values also include emissions associated with
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transportation. A detailed discussion regarding the methods and assumptions used to calcu-
late these values is included in the appendix.13 Production from virgin inputs for aluminum
and steel generate significant amounts of emissions in comparison to emissions from produc-
tion with recycled inputs.14 On the other hand, for some paper types, emissions are larger
when re-using the recycled material as opposed to utilizing virgin inputs. Virgin production
of plastics emits a modest level of greenhouse gases, but recycled production emits an order
of magnitude less. Glass produces very little in the way of emissions, regardless of input
type. In the following section, we analytically decompose and interpret the effect of changes
in policy on emissions.
2.2 Policy intervention
Following PSW, we study three price-based instruments: deposit/refund, advance dis-
posal fees, and recycling subsidies. As in PSW, we assume these policies are implemented
at the producer level, and that the incentives provided by these policies are passed on to
consumers. First, a deposit/refund is a two-part instrument that places a fee on a product,
in the form of a deposit at the time of the sale, that is returned via a refund if the con-
sumer recycles the item at a redemption center. Second, the advance disposal fee is simply
a fee levied on the sale of an item, and is traditionally set equal to the cost of material dis-
posal. Lastly, the recycling subsidy is a subsidy on materials that is given to consumers who
choose to return items for recycling. We examine how these three policies effect emissions
generation.
The literature has identified two channels that can reduce total waste disposal: source
reduction and increased recycling. Source reduction operates through reductions in consump-
tion, or in terms of the model, by reducing D(pq, pq − pr). The recycling channel operates
13See “Solid Waste Management and Greenhouse Gases: A Life-Cycle Assessment of Emissions and Sinks”
(2009). The EPA study reports metric tons of carbon-equivalent emissions per ton of material produced.




14The substantial emissions associated with aluminum production from virgin inputs stems from the
energy usage and emissions of the electrolytic smelting process used to extract pure aluminum metal from
aluminum oxide.
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through increasing the recycling rate, r(pr). In the context of emissions, similar channels
are exploited by the deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy policies. By
reducing total consumption through source reduction, emissions will fall, and by increasing
the recycling rate, more output is produced from recycled inputs, which is less emissions
intensive for most materials.
The changes in emissions due to policy changes are analytically determined below, de-
composing the effect of each policy into source reduction and increased recycling terms. It
should be noted that the analysis below captures the direct effects of the policy instruments
on emissions. However, because the scrap price pr is endogenously determined by equation
2.3, this price will also depend on the level and type of policy intervention, generating indi-
rect effects on emissions. While we abstract from this consideration in the derivations below,
these scrap price feedbacks are captured in the simulation analysis.15
2.2.1 Deposit/refund
Consider a deposit/refund of d per ton. Consumers who fail to recycle experience a price
of pq +d, while those who recycle the product receive the refund back, offsetting the deposit.
Thus, demand for the final product can be written as: D(pq + d, pq − pr). At the same time,
the refund encourages recycling, such that the recycling rate is given by: r(pq+d). Emissions
under this instrument are thus given by:
E(d) = δv(1 − r(pr + d))D(pq + d, pq − pr) + δrr(pr + d)D(pq + d, pq − pr) (2.5)
or more compactly:
E(d) = (δv + (δr − δv)r(pr + d))D(pq + d, pq − pr). (2.6)
15Kaffine (2012) analytically explores these indirect scrap price feedbacks in more detail. To summarize,
scrap price increases under an advance disposal fee, generating an indirect increased recycling effect, while
reducing the magnitude of the source reduction effect. Under a recycling subsidy, the scrap price falls,
reducing the magnitude of both the increased recycling effect and negative source reduction effect. The
scrap price under a deposit/refund can either fall or increase, depending on the magnitudes of the increased
recycling and source reduction effects.
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The change in emissions due to a change in the deposit d is given by:
dE
dd
= (δr − δv)D(pq + d, pq − pr)
dr
d(pr + d)




The first term captures the emissions reduction from increased recycling. For most mate-
rials, δr < δv; therefore, as the refund increases the recycling rate, production is shifted
from virgin inputs to less emissions-intensive recycled inputs, reducing emissions per unit of
consumption.16 Clearly, the larger the disparity between δr and δv, the greater the avoided
emissions from the increased recycling effect. The second term captures the decrease in emis-
sions from source reduction, as the deposit discourages consumption, but only for consumers
who do not recycle. For those consumers that do recycle, the deposit/refund will not affect
the price of the consumption good, and thus no source reduction occurs. Interestingly, the
higher the recycling rate r(pr + d), the smaller the emissions reductions from the source
reduction effect will be, as source reduction decreases consumption of goods produced from
both high-emission virgin and low-emission recycled inputs.
Comparing these two effects, the magnitude of the increased recycling effect is likely
smaller than the source reduction effect. Reduction of a ton of consumption via source
reduction generates emission savings equal to the weighted average emissions associated
with a ton of production. By contrast, recycling an additional ton generates emissions
savings equal to the difference between virgin and recycling production emissions (δr − δv).
Thus, unless the recycling rate r(pr + d) is significantly more elastic with respect to the
deposit/refund than consumptionD(pq+d, pq−pr), source reduction will be a more important
source of emissions reductions.17 This stands in contrast to the case of waste reduction, where
recycling an additional ton of material or simply not consuming an additional ton of material
has an identical impact on waste disposal.
16This holds for all but writing and printing paper and paperboard.
17Several exceptions exist (aluminum cans, lumber, fiberboard, and carpet), where emissions savings from
increased recycling are larger than those achieved with source reduction at the current input mix. This occurs
because the difference between the emissions intensities of recycled and virgin inputs (δr − δv) is large and
the recycling rate r(pr + d) is high.
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2.2.2 Advance disposal fee
Next, consider an advance disposal fee of f per ton. Consumers face this fee regardless
if the material is recycled, such that prices for non-recycling consumers are given by pq + f
and pq + f − pr if recycled. Demand for the final good is thus D(pq + f, pq + f − pr) while
the recycling rate r(pr) remains unchanged. Emissions under this instrument are thus given
by:
E(f) = (δv + (δr − δv)r(pr))D(pq + f, pq + f − pr) (2.8)
The change in emissions due to a change in the fee f is given by:
dE
df





∂(pq + f − pr)
) (2.9)
In this case, because the recycling rate is unchanged, there is no induced shift from virgin
to recycled inputs. However, the source reduction channel now has a second term, relative
to the deposit/refund. Because consumers feel the effect of the ADF whether or not they
recycle, the impact of source reduction on emissions will be more pronounced with an ADF
than with a deposit/refund. However, it is unclear if the total reduction in emissions under
the ADF is greater or less than under the deposit/refund. The ADF will lead to more
reductions in emissions if the extra reduction in emissions from source reduction outweighs
the increased recycling under a deposit/refund.
2.2.3 Recycling subsidy
Finally, consider a recycling subsidy of s per ton. Consumers who recycle receive a price
of pr + s, and the effective price of consumption for recycling households is thus pq − pr − s.
Demand for the final good is then given by D(pq, pq − pr − s), and the recycling rate is
r(pr + s). Emissions under this instrument are given by:
E(s) = (δv + (δr − δv)r(pr + s))D(pq, pq − pr − s) (2.10)
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The change in emissions due to a change in the subsidy s is given by:
dE
ds
= (δr − δv)D(pq, pq − pr − s)
dr
d(pr + s)
− (δv + (δr − δv)r(pr + s))
∂D
∂(pq − pr − s)
(2.11)
The first term captures the emissions reduction from increased recycling, provided that δr <
δv. On the other hand, the second term of the expression is positive, and actually increases
emissions. This occurs because recycling subsidies effectively lower the price of goods for
consumers who recycle, and through a negative source reduction effect, leads to an increase
in consumption and emissions. This raises the theoretical possibility that recycling subsidies
may even increase emissions.
To summarize, we can interpret the above results as follows: deposit/refund reduces
both emissions per unit of consumption and the total level of consumption, advance dis-
posal fee reduces total consumption but does not alter emissions per unit of consumption,
and the recycling subsidy reduces emissions per unit of consumption while increasing total
consumption. In the next section, we simulate the effects of these policy instruments on
waste, recycling and emissions. This simulation analysis will allow us to explore the relative
effects of these instruments for which the analytical decompositions are ambiguous. For ex-
ample, does the increased recycling under a deposit/refund outweigh the additional source
reduction under an ADF? Do the increases in emissions from the negative source reduction
under a recycling subsidy outweigh the emission reductions from increased recycling? The
simulations will also provide estimates of the marginal cost of waste and recycling policies
net of emission reduction benefits, as well as allow us to explore optimal instruments and
instrument levels across materials.
2.3 Simulation results
In the section below, we report the results of our simulation results, with an emphasis
on how they compare with the results in Palmer et al. (1997).18 We begin by examining
18PSW find that, for a 10% reduction in total waste, the marginal cost of the deposit/refund is $45 per
ton, the marginal cost of the ADF is $90 per ton, and the marginal cost of the recycling subsidy is $98 per
17
the marginal benefit of emissions reduction per ton of waste reduced under a deposit/re-
fund, advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy. Next, we compare the net marginal cost
of achieving a given reduction in total waste across policies. We then compare uniform in-
tervention levels for each instrument (imposing the same deposit/refund, advance disposal
fee or recycling subsidy across all materials), with the least-cost mix of material-specific
instrument levels.
2.3.1 Benefits of greenhouse gas reductions from waste and recycling policies
For a given percentage reduction in waste, we calculate the necessary deposit/refund,
advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy. Based on the estimated level of the instrument,
the emissions associated with the waste and recycling portfolio are determined, and the
marginal benefits of reduced emissions (at $25 per MTCO2e) per ton of waste reduced are
plotted in Figure 2.1.19 The vertical axis represents the marginal benefit per ton from GHG
emission reductions while the horizontal axis represents the percentage reduction in total
waste.
Several important points emerge from Figure 2.1. First, the advance disposal fee gener-
ates more emissions reductions (and thus benefits) than the deposit/refund, which suggests
that the increased recycling effect from the deposit/refund (equation 2.7) does not offset the
larger source reduction effect from the advance disposal fee (equation 2.9). The benefit of
emissions avoided under the ADF is roughly $38 per ton of waste reduced, while the emission
benefits under the deposit/refund varies from $25-$30 per ton. Second, the recycling subsidy
generates substantially less reductions in emissions relative to the other policies (roughly $10
per ton of waste reduced). The analytical decomposition in the previous section provides
ton. Based on an assumed social cost of $33 dollars per ton of waste disposal, the authors conclude that
a 7.5% reduction in total waste under a deposit/refund would be justified. These numbers will provide a
useful benchmark for the discussion below.
19The US Interagency Working Group On Social Cost Of Carbon calculated several estimates of the social
costs of carbon. $25 per MTCO2e in 1990 dollars is roughly equivalent to the Working Groups’s $35 per short
ton of CO2 in 2007 dollars under an assumed 2.5% discount rate. See “Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866” at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf
and Greenstone et al. (2011) for further details on methodologies and assumptions. In section 2.4.2, we
explore the sensitivity of our main results to alternative specifications of the social cost of GHG emissions.
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Figure 2.1: Marginal benefits per ton associated with greenhouse gas reductions under the
deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy necessary to achieve various
percentage waste reductions.
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intuition as to why this occurs - despite the decrease in emissions due to increased recycling
rates, the subsidy increases consumption by lowering the cost of consumer goods, increasing
emissions and offsetting the reduction from increased recycling. Note, however, that because
the benefit curve under the recycling subsidy is still positive, the increased recycling effect
dominates the negative source reduction effect. Finally, the total benefits from emissions
reductions caused by waste and recycling policies can be substantial. Under an advance
disposal fee, a 10% reduction in total waste would generate $342 million dollars in benefits
through a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 13.7 million tons.
2.3.2 Least-cost policy with greenhouse gas externalities
We now examine the marginal cost of the three policy instruments incorporating the
benefits of greenhouse gas reductions. Again, for a given percentage reduction in waste, we
calculate the necessary deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy. Based
on the level of the instrument, the emissions associated with the waste and recycling portfolio
are determined, and the benefits of reduced emissions (at $25 per MTCO2e) are subtracted
from the marginal cost of the policy. Figure 2.2 displays the net marginal cost per ton of
achieving a given percentage reduction in total waste, where the vertical axis represents the
marginal cost of the policy net of greenhouse gas benefits (scaled to $/ton of waste), and the
horizontal axis represents the percentage reduction in total waste disposal.
Several results are to be highlighted. At $25 dollars per MTCO2e as the social cost of
carbon and $33 dollars as the marginal social damage of a ton of waste (PSW’s estimate of the
social costs of waste disposal), a 14% reduction in total solid waste would be justified (under
deposit/refund).20 This represents a nearly 100% increase in total waste reduction relative
to 7.5% in PSW. Using the social cost of waste disposal of $5-9 dollars in Kinnaman (2006)
would justify an 8% reduction in total waste, compared to a less than 1% reduction based
on the the social cost of waste disposal alone. In the extreme case where waste disposal
20Because the benefits of emissions reductions per ton of waste reduced have been netted from the vertical






































































































































































Figure 2.2: Net marginal cost per ton of the deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and
recycling subsidy necessary to achieve various percentage reductions in total waste disposal.
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generates no social costs, a reduction in total waste of 6% is justified solely by emissions
savings. Finally, we note that the net marginal cost of a deposit/refund to achieve a 10%
reduction in solid waste is substantially smaller than in PSW, at $19 dollars per ton versus
$45 dollars per ton. This suggests that the emissions avoided via waste and recycling policies
is an important factor that should be considered when selecting policy intervention levels.
Surprisingly, the advanced disposal fee is the least-cost policy for waste reductions of
less than 4%. This occurs because the ADF provides the most benefit per ton in terms of
reduced greenhouse gas emissions per Figure 2.1, while the primary cost for all policies is
relatively low for small reductions in waste. It should be noted that the marginal benefit
per ton in terms of reduced greenhouse gases is relatively flat, while the marginal primary
cost per ton increases with respect to the reduction in total waste (per figure I in PSW).
The deposit/refund has the lowest marginal primary cost per ton, and as a result, the
deposit/refund is the least-cost policy for larger waste reductions above 4%. In other words,
the larger marginal benefits per ton (from reduced greenhouse gases) from the advance
disposal fee initially make it more attractive than the deposit/refund, but the increasing
magnitude of the primary policy costs eventually leads the deposit/refund to be the least-
cost policy.
Finally, the cost of the recycling subsidy is only slightly reduced by the inclusion of
benefits from reduced emissions. The net marginal cost for a 10% reduction in total waste
is $87 dollars per ton, only slightly less than the $98 dollars per ton in PSW. By contrast,
both the deposit/refund and the advance disposal fee see large reductions in marginal cost,
from $45 per ton down to $19 per ton for the deposit/refund, and from $90 dollars per ton
down to $45 dollars per ton for the advance disposal fee.
2.3.3 Material-specific instruments
In the above analysis, the instrument levels were assumed to be uniform across all material
types. In Palmer et al. (1997), this is the optimal policy because materials are undifferenti-
ated in terms of the social costs of disposal. Here, we set material-specific instrument levels
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to minimize the marginal cost of waste reduction net of emissions benefits; for example,
allowing the advance disposal fee for glass to be different than the advance disposal fee for
aluminum.21 The intuition is that, due to heterogeneity in emissions by material, we should
adjust the instrument level by material accordingly - increasing instrument levels for materi-
als that provide larger emissions reductions and correspondingly reducing instrument levels
for materials with less emissions reductions.
For a 10% reduction in total waste, the use of material-specific instrument levels provides
a modest reduction in marginal cost. For the deposit/refund, net marginal cost with material-
specific levels is $16.9 per ton versus $18.7 per ton. A material-specific ADF has a net
marginal cost of $41.0 per ton compared to $45.2 per ton under a uniform ADF. Under a
material-specific recycling subsidy, marginal cost per ton is $80.7 compared to $87.3 under
a uniform recycling subsidy. Thus the cost-savings from material-specific instruments levels
is roughly a 10% reduction in the cost of achieving a given waste reduction.
Table 2.2 reports the reductions in waste and emissions under the material-specific
intervention levels. The material-specific deposit/refund varies substantially by material,
from a high of $423.78 dollars per ton for aluminum to a low of $25.65 per ton for glass.
The large deposit/refund on aluminum reflects the fact that substantial emissions savings
are achieved through reducing the use of virgin inputs in production. Despite the large
deposit/refund, the smallest share of total waste reduction comes from aluminum, with
paper’s $36.45 per ton deposit/refund generating over one-third of the total waste reduction.
Despite this small share in total waste reduction, in terms of percentage reduction in material-
specific waste, aluminum has the highest reduction at 31%. This stands in stark contrast
to the uniform deposit/refund, which results in a paltry reduction in aluminum of 3.6%.
Comparing with the uniform deposit/refund, the percentage reduction in steel waste rises
from 11.2% to 19.8%, while glass falls from 26.4% to 16.4%. Finally, despite aluminum’s small
contribution to total waste reduction, it contributes the most in terms of emissions reductions
21Operationally, intervention levels were adjusted for each material until the specified reduction in total
waste was met at minimum total cost.
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(6.484 million MTCO2e), followed closely by steel (4.810 million MTCO2e). Also of note,
emissions reductions are substantially larger (50% more) under the variable deposit/refund
compared to the uniform deposit/refund.
Similar trends across materials occur for the advance disposal fee, though it should be
noted that total emissions reductions under the ADF are larger under both the uniform and
material-specific ADF relative to deposit/refund. By comparison, we see a slightly different
pattern of waste reduction by material under a recycling subsidy. The percentage reduction
in glass waste is substantially higher and the reduction in aluminum waste substantially
lower. Furthermore, the reduction in plastics under a recycling subsidy is effectively zero.
Recycling subsidies generate no reductions in plastic waste (the increased recycling effect
is offset by the negative source reduction effect), and as such, the marginal cost of waste
reduction is essentially infinite. In general, material-specific intervention levels tend to favor
larger percentage waste reductions in aluminum and steel relative to the uniform policy.
To put this in perspective, under a 10% reduction in waste via a uniform deposit/refund,
the deposit/refund is equal to 0.12 cents per aluminum can, 0.22 cents per plastic bottle,
5.6 cents per newspaper, 0.5 cents per steel can, and 1.7 cents per glass bottle.22 When
the deposit/refund is set variably across materials to minimize the cost of achieving a 10%
reduction in waste, the deposit/refund is equal to 1.1 cents per aluminum can, 0.35 cents per
plastic bottle, 4.5 cents per newspaper, 0.83 cents per steel can, and 1 cent per glass bottle.
Relative to the uniform deposit/refunds, the material-specific deposit/refunds are substan-
tially larger for aluminum and steel can, reflecting the emissions savings from targeting those
materials.
2.4 Further analysis
In this section, we explore two additional questions. In the previous section, we find that
there are modest cost-savings associated with allowing material-specific intervention levels
22The deposit/refund has been inflation-adjusted to give an idea of the level of the deposit/refund in
2011$
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Table 2.2: Uniform and material-specific intervention levels for a 10% reduction in waste
Uniform Material-specific
Paper Glass Aluminum Steel Plastic
Deposit/refund $44.94 $36.72 $25.93 $424.26 $77.31 $70.46
($ per ton)
Waste reduction 9.163 3.813 1.543 0.511 2.056 1.240
(million tons)
Percent waste 10% 7.2% 16.1% 31.0% 19.7% 7.7%
reduction
Emissions reduction 9.212 2.846 0.437 6.473 4.837 2.340
(million MTCO2e)
Percent emissions 5.3% 3.4% 7.4% 28.9% 15.5% 7.7%
reduction
Advance disposal fee $85.15 $75.39 $59.91 $505.23 $123.26 $95.94
($ per ton)
Waste reduction 9.163 4.020 1.420 0.446 1.640 1.638
(million tons)
Percent waste 10% 7.6% 14.9% 27.1% 15.8% 10.2%
reduction
Emissions reduction 13.944 4.976 0.729 5.875 4.717 3.093
(million MTCO2e)
Percent emissions 8.0% 5.9% 12.4% 26.2% 15.1% 10.2%
reduction
Recycling Subsidy $97.07 $79.13 $85.24 $597.22 $126.98 $0
($ per ton)
Waste reduction 9.163 3.813 2.927 0.208 2.215 0
(million tons)
Percent waste 10% 7.2% 30.6% 12.6% 21.3% 0%
reduction
Emissions reduction 3.120 0.220 0.261 2.241 3.824 0
(million MTCO2e)
Percent emissions 1.8% 0.3% 4.64% 10.0% 12.2% 0%
reduction
Note: Material-specific instrument levels calculated as the instrument level that achieves a 10% reduction in
total waste at a minimum net cost. As a point of comparison, Palmer et al. (1997) find that for the uniform
deposit/refund required to achieve a 10% reduction in total waste, paper, glass, aluminum, steel, and plastic
waste are reduced by 8.7%, 26.4%, 3.6%, 11.2%, and 5.1% respectively. For the advance disposal fees, material
reductions are 8.5%, 20.0%, 5.4%, 11.5%, and 9.1%, and for the recycling subsidy, material reductions are 8.4%,
33.6%, 1.6%, 14.2%, and .04%.
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by policy. We now look at potential cost-savings from allowing both variable policies and
variable intervention levels by material (for example, a $25 dollar per ton advance disposal fee
for glass and a $40 dollar per ton deposit/refund for paper). We also explore the sensitivity
of our primary results to alternative assumptions regarding the social costs of greenhouse
gas emissions.
2.4.1 Variable policies by material
We first consider the least-cost combination of instruments and instrument levels by
material. Table 2.3 reports the least-cost policy by instrument and the corresponding
instrument level for 2.5%, 5%, 10% and 20% reductions in total waste. For larger reductions
in total waste, the deposit/refund is selected for all materials. However, for smaller reductions
in waste, the advance disposal fee is preferred for paper and glass.23 Consistent with the
previous sections, the recycling subsidy is never the least-cost instrument for any material
at any level of total waste reduction.
The final two rows for Table 2.3 compare the net marginal cost per ton when instruments
are allowed to vary by material (Variable Policy) with the net marginal cost per ton when
only a single instrument can be used (Uniform Policy). Allowing variable instruments by
material does produce small cost-savings, but only at the smallest levels of total waste
reduction. For larger reductions in total waste, the deposit/refund is always the least-cost
instrument. From the perspective of policymakers, the administrative costs of managing
separate policy instruments for different materials may outweigh the small potential cost-
savings offered by the flexibility of material-specific instruments.
2.4.2 Sensitivity to alternative social costs of GHG emissions
Next, we consider the importance of the assumed $25 per MTCO2e cost of GHG emissions
and $33 per ton social cost of waste disposal. To explore the sensitivity of our results to
emissions assumption, we compare, for a 10% reduction in total waste, the net marginal
23At 2.5% reduction in total waste, no intervention is necessary in the glass market.
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Table 2.3: Material-specific optimal instrument and intervention level for various waste
reduction percentages
Total Waste Reduction
2.5% 5% 10% 20%
Paper and paperboard
Instrument ADF ADF Dep/Ref Dep/Ref
Instrument Level $6.54 $26.72 $36.72 $89.18
Glass
Instrument N/A ADF Dep/Ref Dep/Ref
Instrument Level $0 $10.67 $25.93 $78.44
Aluminum
Instrument Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref
Instrument Level $379.34 $400.17 $424.26 $477.65
Steel
Instrument Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref
Instrument Level $37.42 $55.89 $77.31 $125.53
Plastics
Instrument Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref Dep/Ref
Instrument Level $26.70 $46.99 $70.46 $122.54
Net Marginal Cost/Variable policy -$26.02 -$5.99 $17.17 $68.54
Net Marginal Cost/Uniform policy -$23.37 -$5.30 $17.17 $68.54
Note: Level indicates the price of the specific intervention required to achieve the target waste
reduction across all materials.
27
costs of the deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and recycling subsidy under varying values
for the social costs of GHG emissions. The net marginal costs are plotted on the vertical
















































































































Figure 2.3: Net marginal cost per ton of the deposit/refund, advance disposal fee, and
recycling subsidy for a 10% reduction in total waste for varying values of the social cost of
greenhouse gas emissions.
From Figure 2.3, we see that the deposit/refund is the least-cost policy within a wide-
range of the $25 dollar per ton assumption. However, it should be noted that the net
marginal cost of the advance disposal fee decreases the fastest of all the policies, and at $80
dollars per MTCO2e, it emerges as the least-cost policy. This is intuitive, as the advance
disposal fee produces the greatest reductions in CO2 equivalent emissions, per Figure 2.1.
As Figure 2.1 also foreshadows, the net marginal costs of the recycling subsidy fall the
slowest as the social costs of emissions rise. Strikingly, even at $100 dollars per MTCO2e,
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the recycling subsidy with emissions savings included is more costly than the deposit/refund
with none of the benefits of emissions reductions included.
2.5 Conclusions
In recent years, a renewed interest in recycling and waste policies has surfaced, in light
of rising concerns over greenhouse gas emissions from the production of various consumer
goods. In the absence of an implemented carbon pricing scheme, alternative policies are
required to address unpriced greenhouse gas emissions externalities. This paper investigates
second-best waste reduction and recycling policies to address such externalities. We compare
three waste reduction and recycling policy alternatives and weigh the costs of each policy net
the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to achieve a given percentage
reduction in waste. In the absence of upstream production externalities considerations,
waste and recycling policies have little to no justification; however after accounting for
upstream greenhouse gas emissions externalities, policy intervention is significantly justified.
After incorporating such externalities into an extension of the calibrated mass-balance model
developed in Palmer et al. (1997), we find that the benefits of emissions reductions are of
the same order (using a social cost of waste given by Palmer et al. (1997)) or significantly
larger (using a social cost of waste given by Kinnaman (2006)) than the benefits of avoided
waste disposal. These results imply that when policies are properly set to account for the
marginal damage of upstream production externalities, the optimal total waste reduction
level is larger than previously found. At a 10% reduction in total waste, the simulation finds
that the least-cost policy is cut in half from a deposit/refund of $45 per ton found by PSW
to $19 per ton once greenhouse gas benefits are considered.
In the analysis, we provide a decomposition of the three policies to highlight the two
channels of emissions reduction that are exploited by the policies. The source reduction
channel provides greater savings for most materials, by reducing total emissions, while the
increased recycling channel only provides savings by reducing the marginal emissions asso-
ciated with each material. The ADF provides the greatest benefits in the way of emissions
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reductions, through an enhanced source reduction channel. Moreover, the ADF is the least-
cost policy for small reductions in total waste disposal, with the deposit/refund emerging
as the least-cost policy when total waste reduction increases beyond 5%. Despite the fact
that fewer emissions are produced from recycled inputs relative to virgin inputs, a direct
recycling subsidy is the most costly policy of the three instruments examined in this study
and produces the least emissions reductions.24 This manifests as a result of the recycling
subsidy having a negative source reduction channel, effectively increasing consumption by
lowering the final price of consumer goods.
This study also finds that a modest cost-savings is achieved when policy instrument levels
are allowed to vary by material, finding a substantial variation in the instrument level across
materials. For a 10% reduction in total solid waste, the optimal deposit/refund assigns a high
of $423.78 per ton of aluminum to a low of $25.65 per ton of glass, highlighting the large
disparity in emissions savings between the materials. We also consider an optimal policy
design that allows instrument levels and instrument type to vary across material, but find
that potential cost-savings are minor and may be outweighed by increased implementation
costs. Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that rising social costs of greenhouse gas emissions
enhance the attractiveness of the ADF, as the emissions benefits from the increased source
reduction channel outweigh alternative policy choices.
We note several results of particular policy relevance. First, though we consider only
one externality of upstream production (greenhouse gas emissions reduction), the benefits of
addressing this single upstream externality are roughly as large or larger than the benefits
24A limitation of the current study is that it only considers market instruments. A beneficial extension
of this study would be to consider non-market policies such as curbside recycling and extended producer
responsibility. Conceptually, curbside recycling functions similar to a direct recycling subsidy, with the key
difference that it does not encourage additional consumption. Thus, emissions reductions would occur solely
through the increased recycling channel. Extended producer responsibility (EPR) would be challenging to
evaluate in the framework presented above, given the heterogeneity in EPR implementation (Fleckinger and
Glachant, 2010). On the one hand, EPR may function like an advance disposal fee by simply raising the
cost of consumption goods, generating fewer emissions via source reduction. On the other hand, if EPR
encourages firms to “Design for Environment” (Calcott and Walls, 2000) by improving the recyclability of
products, then EPR may function similar to a deposit/refund as emissions per unit of consumption are also
reduced.
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associated with avoided waste disposal. Incorporating additional externalities such as land-
use and forestry-related externalities from paper production, or extraction externalities of
aluminum and iron ore production for example, could further highlight the importance of
considering upstream production when deciding amongst waste and recycling policies. In
fact, it may be the case that in the absence of carbon pricing, the most important aspect
of waste and recycling policy is the impact on these upstream production externalities, with
avoided disposal of waste in landfills a secondary concern. Next, while the reduction in
emissions from the use of recycled inputs may make direct recycling subsides intuitively
appealing, our results should give policymakers pause. While recycling rates will increase
under recycling subsidies, the rebound effect of increased consumption can significantly erode
emissions reductions, generating smaller reductions in emissions at a higher cost than either
deposit/refunds or advance disposal fees.
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CHAPTER 3
WHAT PRODUCTS SHOULD BE RECYCLED? EXAMINING THE JUSTIFICATION
FOR RECYCLING POLICY FROM A MATERIAL-SPECIFIC APPROACH
Recycling rates of municipal solid waste have grown substantially in the U.S. over the
past 30 years, increasing from less than 7% in 1980 to 34% in 2010 (EPA, 2011). The rise in
recycling occurred largely as a result of policies that were adopted to address growing con-
cerns over declining landfill capacity and waste externalities. More recently, however, interest
in expanding recycling policies to further increase recycling rates has emerged in response
to concerns over greenhouse gas emissions externalities from energy-intensive manufacturing
processes.
In the U.S., several states have adopted mandated waste diversion rate targets in an effort
to reduce current waste levels. For instance, California and Florida have recently passed bills
to mandate that 75% of all municipal solid waste streams (MSW) is diverted from landfills
by 2020.25 Thus, several key questions emerge: what is the socially optimal recycling rate
and how different is the socially optimal recycling rate from the observed rate of recycling?
Additionally, how does this rate vary among materials? Drawing upon an optimal two-part
instrument to achieve a first-best solution, the current paper accounts for upstream and
downstream externalities in order to derive the socially optimal recycling rate for common
household products.
In general, there are two primary reasons that recycling generates environmental benefits,
and these are the main drivers behind increasing the recycling rates of municipalities. First,
increasing recycling decreases waste and landfill use. The existence of externalities associated
with landfills generates social costs that are not internalized by municipalities. Such costs
25Diversion targets are typically achieved through a combination of increased recycling, composting, and
combustion, although recycling provides the largest source of diverted waste, representing 60% of the share
of waste diverted from landfills (EPA, 2011).
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include the greenhouse gas emissions from waste decomposition and the cost of land value
depreciation to the community surrounding a landfill site. Second, increasing the recycling
rate increases the flow of secondary materials for use as inputs into production of new
consumer goods and decreases the need for virgin material inputs. For certain goods, this
reduces the costly and energy-intensive mining and manufacturing activities required for
virgin material production, thereby reducing the overall greenhouse gas emissions generated.
For both reasons, the recycling of MSW is seen as a sustainable solution to product life-cycle
management.26
In order to capture the benefits from recycling, it is appropriate to incorporate unpriced
externalities that are generated by recycling products. The socially optimal recycling rate
must therefore account for such externalities, where net social welfare is maximized. Various
policy mechanisms such as a product tax, recycling subsidy, or combined deposit/refund
offer market-based solutions to account for the unpriced benefits of recycling, and have been
examined by Palmer et al. (1997), Palmer and Walls (1997), and Acuff and Kaffine (2012).
Initially, the literature on recycling policy intervention began in response to the concern
over waste disposal reduction, using waste and recycling policy to address waste externali-
ties. The most efficient policy tool to achieve a direct reduction in waste is a variable tax/fee
applied to waste disposal, either applying a charge by weight or volume (Jenkins, 1993);
however, this may lead to illegal dumping if households have zero-cost illegal disposal alter-
natives (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996). Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) find that in the
presence of illegal disposal alternatives, a positive variable fee leads to suboptimal outcomes
and in such instances, the optimal instrument level may be zero or negative. Thus, several
authors have examined the optimal instrument when disposal taxes are infeasible. Dinan
(1993), Sigman (1995), Palmer et al. (1997), Palmer and Walls (1997), and Walls and Palmer
(2001) show that a two-part instrument with a tax on output and subsidy on recycling, such
as a deposit/refund, is a preferred method in instances when illegal dumping can occur.
26A third concern exists, relating to the scarcity of resources, especially in regards to non-renewable
materials as mentioned by Tilton (2003).
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Later, a second surge in recycling policy literature addressed product life-cycle consid-
erations, using recycling policy as a second-best tool to address upstream production exter-
nalities. In instances when production of goods causes pollution or other residual damage,
Palmer et al. (1997) and Kinnaman (2006) point out that the optimal policy intervention
to handle upstream externalities is at their source, in contrast to using a second-best waste
or recycling policy instrument. This is confirmed by Walls and Palmer (2001), who show
that placing an output tax equal to the marginal social damage of the upstream externality
coupled with a downstream instrument equal to the marginal social damage of waste dis-
posal can achieve an optimal outcome. The upstream externality can be accounted for using
information from a life-cycle analysis in a mass-balance framework. Therefore, the optimal
market solution that will achieve the socially optimal recycling rate is a two-part instrument
that taxes upstream production emissions, thereby promoting producers switch to less emis-
sions costly inputs, and a deposit/refund to tax consumption and encourage consumers to
recycle.
Drawing upon the optimal two-part instrument, the current paper accounts for upstream
and downstream greenhouse gas emissions and waste disposal externalities in order to derive
the socially optimal recycling rate.27 Here, we assume that the only externalities that exist
are those from greenhouse gas emissions and from waste disposal.28 Specifically, we exam-
ine the difference between the observed recycling rate and the socially optimal one under
optimal policy intervention. Parameterizing the model and calibrating to observed data for
eight materials provides numerical solutions to highlight the markets where recycling policy
intervention is justified.
27See Huhtala (1997) who develops an optimal control model to examine optimal recycling rates for MSW
by accounting for only downstream disposal externalities from landfilling. Results from the study show that
a 50% recycling mandate is economically and environmentally justified.
28We abstract from externalities from mining or other material acquisition related activities that may po-
tentially exist. Using the current framework, one could account for additional externalities using appropriate
life-cycle information. For instance, a cross material analysis could compare the durability and functionality
of different materials.
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The results provide insights to policymakers when determining state recycling rate targets
and designing municipal recycling programs, summarized as follows. First, the observed
recycling rate - assumed to be privately optimal here - will depend on the elasticities of
supply and demand in addition to the scrap price in the market for each material. For
all materials, the privately optimal recycling rate will increase as the ratio of the demand
and supply elasticities increases - in other words, if the demand for secondary material is
relatively more inelastic and/or the supply is relatively more elastic. This finding supports
material-specific considerations, even in the absence of externalities. When accounting for
externalities, the socially optimal recycling rate will depend on the marginal social damage
from production activities and waste management. The empirical results show that for
materials with low quantities of greenhouse gas emissions from production activity - such
as newspapers, glass, and plastics - little change to the observed recycling rates is justified.
By contrast, significant increases in recycling rates are justified for steel, aluminum, and
mixed papers, whose production process requirements are more energy - and thus more
emissions - intensive. Additionally, we see a strong difference in the justified changes to
recycling rates for paper and non-ferrous materials, whose downstream damages depend on
whether the waste is being sent to a landfill or a combustion facility. As a result, recycling
policy intervention can only be justified in these markets. Thus, we see justifications for
material-specific recycling rate targets due to both private market and external damage
factors. Lastly, the magnitude of the upstream externalities are typically much larger than
that of downstream externalities, further strengthening the justification for production-side
market intervention in comparison to disposal-side market intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is presented in an analytical framework to
show the observed privately optimal recycling rate and extended to derive the socially opti-
mal recycling rate. The benchmark and socially optimal rates are then parameterized and
calibrated to observed U.S. data from 2010 to find numerical results.29 The calculated re-
29Although it could be argued that observed data could be influenced by existing recycling policies, the
author believes that this will not affect the results since we are looking at the deviation from current observed
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sults are then discussed, followed by a sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to
test the robustness of the results. Lastly, results from running the simulation with 1990 data
is provided. The optimal recycling rates are compared across twenty years to distinguish
which materials reached the optimal recycling rates over that time and which never did.
Policy implications and final justifications for market intervention concludes.
3.1 Analytical Model
A basic mass-balance production and emissions partial equilibrium model is used to
represent the relationship between the final good market and the recycled good market. As
shown in equation 3.1, the final product, Q (tons) is composed of the sum of the quantity
of input types: virgin, V , and recycled, R.
Q = R + V (3.1)
It is assumed that all products not recycled become waste, requiring the same quantity of
virgin material input to replace the quantity disposed of. Additionally, the model is static
and assumes simultaneous production, consumption, and disposal. Thus V = (1 − r) ∗ Q,
where r is the recycling rate and is represented by the quantity of tons of recycled material
supplied to the market, Rs, divided by the total quantity consumed as shown by:
r = Rs/Q (3.2)
Additionally, producers will demand a quantity of recycled material Rd (tons) for a price,
Pr ($/ton). At the end of the useful life of consumer goods, materials will be recycled and
supplied to the market at a quantity Rs (tons), dependent on the cost to recycle, Cr ($/ton).
Rd = Rd(Pr) (3.3)
rates (defined as the benchmark case and assumed to be privately optimal here) to the socially optimal rate.
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Rs = Rs(Cr) (3.4)
It is assumed that producers have decreasing marginal benefits from using recycled ma-
terials dRd
dPr
< 0 and that consumers have increasing marginal costs of recycling dRs
dCr
> 0.30
The inverse market demand and supply functions can be represented by, Pr(Rd) and Cr(Rs),
where at equilibrium Rd = Rs. Solving for the equilibrium R
∗ will be where the net private
surplus is maximized over:
NPS = Max{R}
∫
[Pr(R) − Cr(R)] dR (3.5)
requiring the first order condition:
dNPS
dR
= Pr(R) − Cr(R) = 0 (3.6)
Pr(R) = Cr(R) (3.7)
Thus, equation 3.7 shows us that our marginal private benefits of recycling will be equal to the
marginal private costs to recycle as we would expect under perfect competition. The socially
optimal recycling rate is calculated by modeling the market for recycled materials while
accounting for both upstream production and downstream waste management externalities,
discussed analytically next.
3.1.1 Socially Optimal Case
Recycling provides benefits via two channels of avoided externalities upstream and down-
stream. First, he production of various consumer goods requires energy intensive mining,
manufacturing, and transportation processes. Thus, depending on the combination of input
30The intuition behind this result is that the marginal cost of effort to recycle increases with increasing
recycled quantities, for example consumers may find it easier to recycle at work and more difficult while
traveling.
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sources, the final consumer good will have varying levels of greenhouse gas emissions from
its production. For most materials,31 the recycled input is less energy intensive and thus
has lower greenhouse gas emissions. Similar to Acuff and Kaffine (2012), the model assumes
that emissions can be represented by:
E = δvV + δrR (3.8)
where δv transforms production of goods from virgin materials into emissions and δr trans-
forms recycled production into emissions.
Thus, the marginal social damage of production will depend on the difference of emissions
between recycled and virgin inputs for each material, denoted by δv− δr, measured in metric
tons of CO2-equivalent per ton of material produced. To monetize the marginal social
damage of greenhouse gases, Λg is used to represent the social cost per MTCO2e. Using τ
to represent the marginal social damage of output, we can define the marginal damage as a








Second, the management of waste streams by disposal in landfills or combustion in a
waste-to-energy facility will serve as a source of greenhouse gas emissions, represented by
31Paper products are the exception to this, where reprocessing some papers requires bleaches and chemi-
cals that release more emissions than production from virgin material, when abstracting from deforestation
considerations. Deforestation is not accounted for in this analysis due to the complexity that arises in re-
gards to deforestation and carbon sequestration. In theory, carbon sequestration from private forests will
not change as a result of decreased timber harvest if recycling rates increase and demand for virgin material
declines. The reasoning is that private suppliers of timber will not replant trees that are no longer in demand
and thus no additional carbon will be sequestered than in the baseline case. In fact, this could potentially
lead to a decrease in carbon sequestration in the long term. This was first conceptually discussed by Darby
(1973) and then formally proven by Tatoutchoup and Gaudet (2011) using an optimal control forest rotation
model under a Faustman framework. They show that increasing paper recycling could actually decrease the
land devoted to forestry and also increase the age at which to harvest. Due to the complexity of the issue,
the current analysis does not account for any change in emissions from changes in forest carbon sequestration
as a result of recycling behavior.
32The framework discussed here is used for analytical purposes only in order to obtain an explicit solution
for the socially optimal rate. In contrast, the numerical calculations directly use the marginal social damages,
assumed to be at the optimal recycling rate, and not as a percentage of the price.
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δw, depending on the material type.
33 The marginal social damage of waste disposal in the
absence of emissions considerations is represented by Λw, which is measured as the social cost
per ton of material landfilled. Adding this cost to the social cost of emissions from landfilling
will yield the marginal social benefits from avoided waste, represented by φ. The marginal
social benefit of recycling through the channel of avoided waste can then be expressed as a








Finally, this framework assumes that social marginal benefits from using recycled inputs are
decreasing with quantity recycled, dφ
dR
< 0, and that social marginal costs of recycling are
increasing, dτ
dR
> 0. Additionally, it is assumed that the marginal social damages are defined
at the optimal quantity of recycled material, as shown by:
τ ′ = τ ′(R∗), (3.11)
φ′ = φ′(R∗) (3.12)




′) − Cr(R)(1 − φ′)] dR (3.13)
and the R that maximizes net social surplus will be where:
dNSS
dR
= Pr(R)(1 + τ
′) − Cr(R)(1 − φ′) = 0
Pr(R)(1 + τ
′) = Cr(R)(1 − φ′)
(3.14)
This condition yields an R∗s that solves for the social marginal benefits be set equal to the
social marginal costs of recycling.
33Organic materials, such as paper and food items, emit methane during the decomposition process, while
metals, plastics, and glass do not.
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3.2 Parameterized Model
Next, the model is parameterized to find numerical solutions. Following Palmer et al.
(1997), constant elasticity functions are used to represent the rate of supplied recycled ma-
terial and the demand for recycled material, as introduced in equations 3.3 and 3.4. Using
data from the observed secondary market shown in Table 3.1 allows us to calculate a nu-
merical solution for the optimal recycling rate of eight consumer goods, given an exogenous
consumption level.34




where γ and α are positive scalars and εdr and εsr are the price elasticities of demand and
supply respectively.
Table 3.1: Consumption and recycled quantities reported for various municipal solid waste
materials in the US for 2010 (1,000 Tons/year)
Material Generated, Q Recycled quantity, R rate, r (%)
Newspaper 9,880 7,074 71.6
Nondurable Papers 23,690 10,661 45.0
Paperboard 37,680 26,866 71.3
Glass Containers 9,360 3,126 33.4
Aluminum Cans 1,370 680 49.6
Steel Cans 2,300 1,541 67.0
PET bottles 2,670 780 29.2
HDPE bottles 800 220 27.5
Total MSW 249,860 85,140 34.1
Values obtained from EPA (2011), a report generated using a mass balance approach to approxi-
mate national municipal solid waste information. Nondurable papers largely represent office paper
and the remaining non-newspaper and non-board paper types.
34In reality, in the presence of a subsidy for recycling, final product demand may increase and contribute
to negative source reduction and increased consumption. Additionally, a tax on inputs would raise the
final good price and may decrease demand and increase source reduction and decreased consumption. The
current study abstracts from such considerations by assuming that consumption behavior is not impacted
by production and disposal policies.
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Table 3.2: Secondary material prices and supply and demand price elasticities for various
municipal solid waste materials
Material Pr($/ton) Demand Elasticity, εdr Supply Elasticity, εsr
Newspaper 90 -0.12 0.84
Nondurable Papers 150 -0.16 0.84
Paperboard 135 -0.16 0.84
Glass Containers 312 -0.50 0.37
Aluminum Cans 1142 -0.81 1.50
Steel Cans 361 -0.63 1.44
PET bottles 348 -0.10 0.50
HDPE bottles 553 -0.10 0.50
Prices were obtained from RISI and the American Metals Market, which represent scrap prices in 2010 for the various
materials. Demand elasticities were adopted from values used by Palmer et al. (1997). Supply elasticities for all
materials were obtained using the mean of several estimates provided by Palmer et al. (1997), Bingham et al. (1983),
Blomberg and Soderholm (2009).
3.2.1 Benchmark Case
Combining equations 3.2 and 3.15 to get the inverse supply function and using the inverse
of the market demand function from equation 3.16, we can solve for the R∗p that maximizes
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where the R∗ that maximizes the total welfare function represents the quantity required to
return the optimal recycling rate for the benchmark case, in the absence of any uniform policy
41
intervention. Using comparative statics, the parameterized solution can provide insights
into how the this recycling quantity will change in the absence of policy intervention. The






1−x )(ln(γ(αQ)−x) + (x− 1)ln(αQ))
(x− 1)2
(3.20)
where x will always be negative. Thus, the only negative term in equation 3.20 is the last




(x− 1)ln(αQ) + (ln(γ(αQ)−x) > 0,
ln(γ) − ln(αQ) > 0
(3.21)




Where we can verify that this result holds since:







where we know that εsr − εdr > 0 since εdr < 0 and εsr > 0 for all materials. Thus, we can
say that:
P εsr−εdrr > 1 (3.24)
will be true at all times when Pr > 1. Thus, if we assume that the condition Pr > 1 always




implying that the privately optimal recycling rate increases with the ratio of elasticities
within the market for each secondary material.
This parametric result echoes the numeric solution found by Palmer et al. (1997), who
show that the least-cost method to reduce waste of varying materials - through a combination
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of source reduction and increased recycling - is to allow the percentage reductions in waste
to vary across material types. Moreover, they suggest that materials with high elasticities
of demand and low scrap prices can be reduced cheaply. Specifically, the least-cost policy
shows a large disparity of reduction between materials, highlighting the fact that certain
material waste can be reduced at a lower cost than other materials. This is in contrast to
a more costly policy approach that requires a uniform waste reduction percentage of each
material type. To add to this finding, the result we derive here shows that recycling rates
will also vary by material-specific conditions.
Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of this result, which shows how the privately optimal
recycling rate of common paper types changes with the change in elasticity ratio. In general,
recycling rates increase as the price elasticity of demand becomes inelastic as in Figure 3.3
and/or the price elasticity of supply becomes elastic as in Figure 3.2. Intuitively, as the
supply becomes more elastic, it is becoming relatively cheaper for consumers to recycle at
higher rates and thus we see that the observed recycling rate increases. In contrast, as the
demand curve becomes more elastic, indicating that the marginal benefit from using recycled
material is relatively lower, the recycling rate decreases. Therefore, as the demand curve
becomes more inelastic, the recycling rate increases. These results are a manifestation of
the properties of the constant elasticity functions. Thus, we see how the observed recycling
rates will change with the elasticity estimates used.
The key implication from this result is that recycling rates are highly material-specific
since they depend on the elasticities in the material market as well as on the scrap price.
This result, however, does not include the heterogeneous social benefits provided by recycling
different materials. Results from the least-cost policy found in Acuff and Kaffine (2012)
foreshadows the fact that accounting for such non-uniform social benefits further supports
the justification for a material-specific analysis which is discussed next.
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Figure 3.1: Benchmark recycling rate (%) for paper types as a function of the ratio of demand
and supply elasticities x = (εdr/εsr). The privately optimal rate increases as the demand to
supply ratio increases.
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Figure 3.2: The quantity of recycled aluminum increases as the marginal cost curve becomes
more elastic.
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Figure 3.3: The quantity of recycled aluminum increases as the marginal benefit curve
becomes more inelastic.
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3.2.2 Socially Optimal Case
The socially optimal quantity, R∗s is found by extending the parameterized privately
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Thus, the difference between the two recycling quantities, R∗s −R∗p can be reduced to:
R∗s −R∗p = R∗p((
1 − φ′
1 + τ ′
)
εdr
1−εdr/εsr − 1) (3.28)
which shows how the marginal social damages of upstream externalities and marginal social
benefits of avoided waste will determine how the observed rate differs from the socially
optimal rate. The relationship represents the wedge between R∗s − R∗p. The wedge will
depend not only on the elasticities now, but also on the magnitudes of the downstream
externalities φ and upstream externalities τ .
Next, we discuss how to set the optimal instrument in order to numerically solve for the
socially optimal rate.
3.3 Optimal Instrument
To calculate the socially optimal recycling rate of MSW, there are two objectives at hand,
involving participation from both producers and consumers. Walls and Palmer (2001) show
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that at least as many policy instruments are needed as there are market distortions. Thus,
two instruments are required in the model to internalize both upstream production and
downstream disposal externalities associated with a life-cycle analysis of consumer goods.
To set the appropriate instrument level, Dinan (1993) suggests that non-uniform taxes
on waste are most efficient in instances when materials produce different social costs. This
is supported by Walls and Palmer (2001), who illustrate that the optimal instrument on
upstream residual would be equal to τ , the marginal social damage from the material pro-
duction. Thus, assuming a carbon tax is infeasible, similar to Acuff and Kaffine (2012), a
tax is applied onto the input types, equal to the marginal social damage of each input source
and material type in order to internalize upstream production activities. Because the model
is constrained to a mass balance framework, the input taxes are levied proportionately to
the greenhouse gas emissions externalities.35 Producers are charged a tax of t = τ per ton
of material.
Second, consumers decide at the end of the useful life of the good whether to discard of
the item as waste or to recycle it.36 If discarded, the optimal tax would charge consumers
for the marginal social damage of disposal, which is proportional to the greenhouse gas
emissions generated during decomposition, δw,
37 coupled with various other un-priced costs
of waste to society.38 It is assumed, however, that illegal disposal will occur in the presence
of a Pigovian tax on waste disposal. As such, a subsidy of s, equal to the marginal social
damages prevented as a result of recycling, φ, is provided to consumers who recycle.
Thus, the optimal two-part instrument as shown by Walls and Palmer (2001), would
be an upstream tax equal to the marginal social damage of the upstream externality and
35The amount of emissions generated per unit of input will be equal to the marginal emissions that are
provided by an LCA. The LCA utilized in the current study provide average emissions, due to the difficulty
in calculating marginal values.
36Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005) discuss alternatives to landfilling or recycling such as source reduction,
re-use, or compositing; however the author abstracts from these considerations.
37Emissions from landfilling will diverge between landfills with waste-to-energy facilities to those with
no energy recovery (Davies and Doble, 2004). As a result, the current analysis uses a weighted average of
emissions as provided by EPA (2006).
38Such costs include the decline in value of land surrounding a landfill, as well as odor, traffic, and
unsightly qualities of a landfill in a community.
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a downstream subsidy equal to the marginal social benefit of the avoided downstream ex-
ternality, both calculated at the optimal quantity, R∗. To numerically solve for the socially
optimal recycled quantity, the marginal social damages of upstream and downstream exter-
nalities are calculated. The emissions produced for the eight materials during the production
of virgin and recycled input types as well as during the decomposition in landfills are listed
in Table 3.3. The marginal social damage of MTCO2e is assigned a value of $50 per ton
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and the marginal social damage of landfill disposal is assigned a value of $5 per compacted
ton.40 The numerical results from the parameterized model is discussed next.
3.4 Waste Management Emissions
The GHG emissions generated or saved from each of the three waste management options,
recycling, combustion, and landfilling, are provided in Table 3.3 for each of the consumer
product materials. The savings in emissions from recycling are simply the difference between
the emissions generated from a ton of virgin material versus a ton of recycled material. More
information on the assumptions and methods used to calculate these emissions is provided
in the appendix.
The net GHG emissions from combustion of mixed MSW are estimated to be less than
the emissions generated from landfilling waste. This is attributed to the utility avoided
from combustion facilities that convert waste to energy and the recovery of ferrous metals.
Emissions from combustion at waste to energy facilities are due to nonbiogenic CO2
41 and
N2O.
42 Additionally, the net emissions from combustion account for the avoided utility from
the electricity produced, thus the net GHG emissions are found by subtracting the avoided
39This value roughly represents the social cost of carbon estimated by the Interagency Working Group on
Social Cost of Carbon (see http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf) adjusted to include
non-CO2 emissions. Since the current analysis is measured in MTCO2e, the $35 estimate using a 2.5%
discount rate is adjusted upwards to include non CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. The social cost is varied in
a sensitivity analysis provided in the results.
40This is in alignment with inflation adjusted values estimated by DEFRA (2004). The Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA, 2004) calculates the social cost of waste disposal to range
from around $4.25 - $7 in 2011 $.
41Biogenic CO2 is excluded here.
42N2O is a major greenhouse gas with roughly 310 times the global warming potential of CO2 and a long
atmospheric lifetime around 120 years.
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utility emissions that result from waste combustion from the total emissions of nonbiogenic
CO2 and N2O.
The main elements that determine the landfill carbon balance are from the initial carbon
content, the carbon output as methane (CH4), the carbon output from CO2, and the residual
carbon stored in the landfill. Landfill emissions are generated as organic matter decomposes
anaerobically and releases CH4. Additionally, some matter does not decompose and instead
is stored in the landfill, sequestering carbon from the atmosphere and counting as a negative
emissions source. Some landfills recover CH4 for electricity generation while others do not.
As with the case for combustion, the avoided utility from CH4 recovery and electricity
generation is subtracted from the emissions that do escape. Both landfilling and combustion
of disposed waste assume emissions from process and transportation of materials by the
baseline amount, representing the current mix of virgin and recycled inputs.
Per the values shown in Table 3.3, the greatest emissions savings for most materials are
generated through recycling. Newspaper, on the other hand, is the exception since when
it is disposed of in landfills it acts as a carbon sink, offsetting the emissions from virgin
production. This is in contrast to office paper and cardboard, which generate significant
emissions during decomposition and generate more emissions during recycling than virgin
material production. As a result, these two paper types yield the greatest emissions savings
with combustion.
3.5 Numerical Results
Calibrating the model to observed values for R∗p enables us to numerically solve for R
∗
s.
Table 3.4 shows the resulting recycling rates r∗s and r
∗
p, in addition to the percentage differ-
ence between the observed recycling rates and the socially optimal rates for eight common
household materials. For materials with low quantities of greenhouse gas emissions from
production activity - such as news papers, glass, and plastics - little change in recycling
rates is justified. In contrast, for materials requiring energy intensive production processes,
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Table 3.3: Net GHG from alternative waste management options (MTCO2e/ton)
Recycling Savings Combustion Emissions Landfilling Emissions
Material (δr − δv) δc δl
Newspaper -0.79 -0.73 -0.88
Nondurable Papers 0.20 -0.62 1.94
Paperboard 0.07 -0.66 0.40
Glass Containers -0.29 0.04 0.04
Aluminum Cans -13.54 0.07 0.04
Steel Cans -1.80 -1.54 0.04
PET Containers -1.54 1.10 0.04
HDPE Containers -1.40 0.92 0.04
Note: Values obtained from “Solid Waste Management and Greenhouse Gases: A Life-Cycle Assessment of Emissions and
Sinks” EPA (2006). See the appendix for more information regarding data source. Values for aluminum and steel were
not differentiated by type. Values were scaled by a molecular weight of 44/12 to convert from MTC-equivalent provided
to find MTCO2-equivalent per ton of material produced. All negative values indicate a net savings in emissions. The net
savings in emissions from recycling represent the difference in emissions to produce virgin and recycled inputs, assuming
recycling of the current mix and accounting for loss rate of recycling each material. The values for combustion are based
on mass burn facilities with national average rate of ferrous recovery. Landfilling values are based on national average
emissions released in 2003.
large interventions in the recycling market are justified by the wedge between the observed
recycling rate and the socially optimal recycling rate.
For instance, aluminum cans were reported to have a recycling rate near 50% in the U.S.
in 2010; however, the socially optimal recycling rate would be closer to 70%. Steel cans
experience a similar increase from an observed rate of 67% to a socially optimal rate near
74%. These divergences in recycling rates represent a 40% and 11% increase from current
rates, respectively. Nondurable paper also experiences an increase from the observed rate,
to a lesser degree, with a 7% increase.
The materials presented here represent 35% of the MSW stream. Under a landfilling-only
option, the optimal recycling rate is 61%, representing about a 4.5% increase in recycling rate
from the current rates, while under the combustion-only option, the optimal recycling rate
is 57%, representing an overall decline in rates of -1.6%. Under the current national average
of the proportion of waste that is sent to landfills and combusted, the simulation calculates
that the optimal recycling rate is 60% for the materials analyzed here. This represents a
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3.5% increase in recycling by weight across all eight materials.
To summarize the findings presented in Table 3.4, different materials in the recycling
stream provide different levels of benefits from being recycled; therefore, the material com-
position of growing recycling streams will determine whether increasing recycling rates has a
positive net social benefit. In total, the increase in recycling rates for all materials from the
observed rates represents a justification to increase recycling rates by a small amount across
the aggregate of all materials. The intuitive reason behind this small increase is due to the
relatively small percentage of the waste stream being composed of the more beneficial metals
and nondurable paper, which represent 4% and 20% of the total waste stream, respectively.
Table 3.4: Privately optimal recycling rates and the percent deviations of the socially optimal
rates from the private rates under various waste management scenarios.
Material rp(%) %∆ %∆ %∆ rs(%)
landfill-only combustion-only U.S. mix U.S. mix
Newspaper 71.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 71.7
Nondurable Papers 45.0 10.3 -3.2 7.1 48.2
Paperboard 71.3 2.2 -3.2 1.1 72.1
Glass Containers 33.4 1.4 1.1 1.4 33.9
Aluminum Cans 49.6 40.5 40.2 40.4 70.0
Steel Cans 67.0 13.2 1.6 10.9 74.3
PET Containers 29.2 2.2 3.7 2.5 30.0
HDPE Containers 27.5 1.2 1.9 1.3 27.9
Weighted Total 58.1 4.4 -1.6 3.5 60.0
The deviations of the privately optimal rates from the socially optimal ones are calculated by (rs − rp)/rp. Socially
optimal rates calculated using a marginal social damage of greenhouse gas emissions and waste disposal of $50 per ton
and $5 per ton respectively. Observed, privately optimal rates were obtained from EPA’s 2010 report Municipal Solid
Waste Generation, Recycling, and Disposal in the United States.
3.5.1 Social Cost of GHG emissions
The numerical solutions presented in Table 3.4 assume a cost of $50 per ton MTCO2e
for the marginal social damage of greenhouse gas emissions. To test the robustness of the
calculated optimal rates, a sensitivity analysis of the social cost of greenhouse gas is provided.
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There are several takeaways from the analysis. First, in Figure 3.4, the optimal recycling
rate for nondurable paper increases slowly with increasing costs to greenhouse gas emissions,
achieving a low of 45% in the absence of greenhouse gas policy and a high near 55% with a cost
of $100 per ton MTCO2e. In addition, the optimal recycling rate for steel climbs steadily
from 67% to around 83% as the cost of CO2e increases. Meanwhile, optimal newspaper,
paperboard, glass, and plastic bottle recycling rates barely change even as costs reach $100
per metric ton CO2e. Lastly, the optimal recycling rate for aluminum increases with the
social cost of CO2e and reaches a high of 100% at a marginal social cost of $100 per metric
ton CO2e. This represents a remarkable change in the optimal recycling rate of aluminum











































































































Figure 3.4: Socially optimal recycling rate (%) of eight common materials for varying values
of the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions.
The differences in the changes to the optimal recycling rates between the materials con-
firms the conclusion that recycling of metals and nondurable papers within the waste stream
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provides the largest benefits, regardless of the social cost of greenhouse gases. Given the het-
erogeneous benefits provided by recycling different materials, the socially optimal recycling
rate will account for such divergences.
These results give insights into how material recycling rates could be affected by car-
bon taxing. Upon implementation of such a policy, recycling rates for nondurable paper,
aluminum, and steel would be likely to increase while other material types would have rela-
tively unchanged recycling rates. Along this logic, internalizing the costs of greenhouse gas
emissions would make it privately optimal to recycle near r∗s .
3.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we check the robustness of the results. The elasticities
of demand and supply are varied using distributions that have been provided by various
literature sources and can be found in Table 3.5. Results from the simulation are shown
in Table 3.6. The most notable feature of the results is that the optimal recycling rates for
the critical materials - nondurable papers, aluminum, and steel - are still quite significant
across lower and upper bounds of the simulation. This is in stark contrast to the other
materials whose socially optimal recycling rates do not change significantly when elasticities
are varied. For instance, changes to recycling rates for newspaper do not change between
the lower and upper bounds, showing a stagnant 0.1% increase in the recycling rate. In
comparison, aluminum recycling rates show justified increases that begin at a low of 21.5%
and increase to a high of 57.8% between the lower and upper bounds.
3.6 Results from 1990 data
By 1990, there were bottle bills in nine states, which were implemented during the 1970’s
and 1980’s. Between 1990 and 2010, additional policies were implemented, driving up recy-
cling rates. In this section, we run the simulation using 1990 data found in Table 3.7 to
make a comparison with the results from 2010. This comparison provides us with an idea
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Table 3.5: Distributions for scrap material elasticities of demand and supply
Material εdr εsr
Newspaper N(-0.12, 0.01) Log-N(0.84, 0.47)
Nondurable Papers N(-0.16, 0.01) Log-N(0.84, 0.47)
Paperboard N(-0.16, 0.01) Log-N(0.84, 0.47)
Glass Containers Log-N(-0.95, 0.60) N(0.37, 0.08)
Aluminum Cans Log-N(-0.81, 0.41) Log-N(1.50, 2.6)
Steel Cans N(-0.63, 0.01) Log-N(1.44, 2.99)
PET Containers Log-N(-0.10, 0.28) Log-N(0.50, 1.95)
HDPE Containers Log-N(-0.10, 0.28) Log-N(0.50, 1.95)
Demand elasticities were adopted from values used by Palmer et al. (1997). Supply elasticities for
all materials were obtained using the mean of several estimates provided by Palmer et al. (1997),
Bingham et al. (1983), Blomberg and Soderholm (2009). The variances for each material were
calculated as sample variances from the various elasticity estimates for each material. The sample
size for newspaper and aluminum was five and the sample size for the remaining materials except
for plastics was four.
Table 3.6: Lower, median, and upper quartiles for the deviation between the 2010 observed
and socially optimal recycling rates across materials
Material Lower 25th % Median Upper 75th %
Newspaper 0.1 0.1 0.1
Nondurable Papers 6.0 7.3 8.4
Paperboard 1.0 1.1 1.2
Glass Containers 1.1 1.4 1.7
Aluminum Cans 21.5 32.4 57.8
Steel Cans 8.1 10.0 13.2
PET Containers 1.2 2.5 4.5
HDPE Containers 0.7 1.3 2.5
Note: These values assume the 2010 U.S. national average of waste management (20% combusted
and 80% landfilled).
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what recycling rates should have gone to, compared to where they actually went twenty
years later.
The results of the 1990 optimal recycling rates suggest that the only materials that
did not exceed the socially optimal rate in 1990 by 2010, were aluminum cans and PET
containers. Additionally from the results, we justify less increases to recycling now than
we did in 1990, due to the fact that most materials have experienced large increases in the
recycling rates. The two years’ results can only be directly compared if we assume that both
observations are privately optimal. When we consider the fact that policies have created a
wedge in material prices and caused an increase in consumer recycling, then we can no longer
make this assumption.43 Therefore it is difficult to make a direct comparison of the socially
optimal recycling rates for both years. It is, however, interesting to compare the socially
optimal rates in 1990 shown in Table 3.8 and the observed rates for 2010, to determine what
materials were recycled versus those that should have been recycled according to the social
benefits provided.
Table 3.7: Consumption and recycled quantities reported for various municipal solid waste
materials in the US for 1990 (1,000 Tons/year)
Material Generated, Q Recycled quantity, R rate, r (%) Pr
Newspaper 12,938 5,497 42.5 18
Nondurable Papers 23,881 3,421 14.3 142
Paperboard 32,605 11,478 35.2 34
Glass Containers 11,905 2,625 22.1 18
Aluminum Cans 1,576 990 62.8 1015
Steel Cans 2,689 630 23.4 67
PET Containers 435 137 31.5 148
HDPE Containers 364 25 6.9 138
Values obtained from Palmer et al. (1997).
43Note that there is a calibration issue so the two years cannot be compared directly. The model re-
calibrates the supply and demand curves for each year so that in 2010, the supply and demand curves do
not lie on the original curves calculated in 1990.
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Table 3.8: Privately optimal recycling rates for 1990 and the percent deviations of the socially
optimal rates from the private rates under various waste management scenarios.
Material rp(%) ∆ (%) ∆(%) ∆ (%) rs(%)
landfill-only combustion-only U.S. mix U.S. mix
Newspaper 42.5 0.2 1.0 0.4 42.6
Nondurable Papers 14.3 6.0 -2.1 4.2 15.0
Paperboard 35.2 5.8 -6.7 2.8 36.2
Glass Containers 22.0 14.8 11.4 14.2 25.2
Aluminum Cans 62.9 25.1 25.0 25.1 78.6
Steel Cans 23.4 55.8 5.3 44.1 33.8
PET Containers 31.5 3.2 5.6 3.7 32.6
HDPE Containers 6.9 3.2 5.2 3.5 7.1
Weighted Total 28.7 7.6 -1.0 5.6 30.3
Table 3.9: The privately optimal and socially optimal recycling rates for 1990 and 2010 and
the percent deviations between the two.
1990 2010
Material rp(%) rs(%) ∆(%) rp(%) rs(%) ∆(%)
Newspaper 42.5 42.6 0.4 71.5 71.7 0.1
Nondurable Papers 14.3 15.0 4.2 45.0 48.2 7.1
Paperboard 35.2 36.2 2.8 71.3 72.1 1.1
Glass Containers 22.0 25.2 14.2 33.4 33.9 1.4
Aluminum Cans 62.9 78.6 25.1 49.6 70.0 40.4
Steel Cans 23.4 33.8 44.1 67.0 74.3 10.9
PET Containers 31.5 32.6 3.7 29.2 30.0 2.5
HDPE Containers 6.9 7.1 3.5 27.5 27.9 1.3
Weighted Total 28.7 30.3 5.6 58.1 60.0 3.5
Assumes the national mix of waste management.
57
The main finding of the comparison of the 1990 optimal recycling rates and the 2010
observed recycling rates found in Table 3.9 is that all but two of the materials reached the
optimal rates in the twenty year period. Recycling rates for aluminum cans and PET bottles
did not achieve the 1990 socially optimal rates. Interestingly, recycling rates for both of
these materials decreased during this time frame, from a starking 63% to 49% for aluminum
cans and a less drastic decline from 31% to 29% for PET containers.44
3.7 Conclusions
The current study examines the socially optimal recycling rate of common household ma-
terials using a “cradle-to-grave” approach that incorporates both upstream and downstream
externalities to model the recycling market. The results show interesting implications that
can be used by policymakers deciding whether to adopt state-mandated recycling rate targets
or other recycling policies.
First, it is parametrically shown that the observed recycling rate is highly dependent on
material-specific characteristics. Specifically, the recycling rate for each material is dependent
on the elasticities of supply and demand in addition to the scrap price in the market for each
material. This result, however, is found in the absence of external considerations. Accounting
for externalities further supports this result, by showing that the benefits of recycling different
materials will depend on the marginal social damage of production and disposal of each
material, which varies significantly between material types. When the numerical model is
adjusted to incorporate externalities, the optimal recycling rate changes significantly for only
three of the eight materials investigated. The only materials that justify significant increases
to current recycling rates are office paper, aluminum and steel. The intuitive reason behind
this result is that the benefits from emissions reductions by increasing the recycling for
these materials are large and as a result, the demand for recycled inputs by producers will
increase. Thus, we see justifications for material-specific recycling rate targets due to both
44See Batson and Eggert (2012) for more on the decline in recycling rates for aluminum used beverage
containers.
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private market and external damage factors. These results are significant across varying
elasticity estimates and values for the social cost of CO2.
In addition to a material-specific analysis, we also see justification for a geographically-
specific analysis. Across the U.S., the national mix of waste management facilities is 20%
waste-to-energy facilities and 80% landfills. When considering a community using only a
combustion facility for waste management, the socially optimal recycling rate for some paper
types is actually less than the observed rate. Similarly, the change to the observed recycling
rate for steel is much smaller than in instances when materials are sent to landfills. These
findings highlight the importance of considering the type of waste management utilized in a
community when making recycling policy decisions. The type of waste management used to
handle disposed materials will impact life-cycle assessment considerations and the resulting
external damages.
To conclude, the socially optimal recycling rate across the total of eight consumer goods
is slightly larger than the current observed recycling rate, by a mere 3.5%. This broad
number, however, neglects the fact that there is strong justification to increase recycling
rates for certain materials and no justification to change recycling rates for the remaining
materials. The results from the simulation show that society would be better off to increase
the recycling rates of metals and nondurable paper only, which constitute about 24% of the
total municipal solid waste stream. The benefits to producers from recycling at this rate
offsets the loss to consumers (either time, energy or other incurred costs) by recycling more.
The results strongly suggest that material-specific recycling rate targets may be beneficial
for municipalities to account for the fact that external benefits are only generated by recy-
cling certain materials. Current recycling rate targets encompass total MSW, to encourage
recycling of all materials within the waste stream. These policy goals could mistakenly lead
to increased recycling of materials that provide little benefit, both privately and socially.
Instead, recycling programs will maximize social welfare by focusing efforts on increasing
recycling rates of key materials that produce the largest external benefits.
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CHAPTER 4
ARE SINGLE STREAM RECYCLING PROGRAMS JUSTIFIED?
Access to curbside recycling programs across the U.S. has grown tenfold over the past
20 years, and not surprisingly, these programs have been a large driver behind increasing
recycling rates. Their success is due to the convenience that it offers consumers. Typically,
consumers will recycle if they feel that it is convenient and that the private costs, such as
the time and effort required to participate, are low. As discussed in Kinnaman and Fullerton
(2001), the presence of curbside recycling programs decreases the private costs faced by
the household. Moreover, Jenkins et al. (2003) show that recycling participation rates for
common consumer materials increase with access to curbside recycling programs (CRPs).
Additionally, over a third of these programs use single stream collection methods, where
households have the luxury of commingling all recyclables into a single bin. As the number
of material streams decrease, from multi to dual to single streams,45 it becomes more con-
venient for consumers to participate in recycling. As a result, such programs are thought to
significantly increase the quantity of materials diverted from landfills beyond that provided
simply from curbside program implementation. On the other hand, contamination of materi-
als typically increases and detracts from the actual amount of material that can be recycled,
creating a central tension that we examine. Thus, this paper provides new evidence of the
effects of single stream recycling programs on the rate of material recycling, after accounting
for contamination.
According to Berenyi (2008), the number of material recovery facilities (MRFs) pro-
cessing single stream materials doubled within the 5 year period between 2003 and 2008,
suggesting a growth in the presence of communities serviced by such programs. This growth
45Dual stream programs are typically characterized by recycling programs that offer one bin to commingle
all beverage containers such as glass, plastic, and aluminum, and a separate bin to collect recyclable fiber
such as cardboard and newspaper in. Multi stream programs are characterized by three or more bins for
separation.
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has occurred in recent years, despite the fact that there is a lack of previous research showing
that these programs provide a net increase in recycling rates. Previous research from Jenkins
et al. (2003) estimated the positive effect of recycling quantities from the adoption of curb-
side recycling programs in a community, however, the distinction between single and multi
stream collection methods was not made. In addition, there was no distinction between the
quantity of materials diverted by households and that actually available to be recycled by
manufacturers.
This paper examines several questions to compare single stream impacts on diversion
and recycling quantities. Do single stream programs increase the diversion of materials by
households? Do single stream programs increase contamination rates of diversion streams?
Accounting for contamination, do single stream programs increase the supply of recycled
materials? Lastly, does conversion from a multi stream program to a single stream recycling
program increase the net social benefits of recycling? Data collected from 437 material
recovery facilities between 2007-2008 across the U.S. provides information to answer these
questions. We employ a cross sectional regression model to estimate whether single stream
recycling programs increase recycling rates of municipal solid waste. We control for key
differences in demographics, MRF characteristics and regional factors - to capture variation
in consumer recycling behavior, MRF operations and regional influences. By controlling for
these variables, we isolate the change of single stream availability on consumer recycling
behavior. Numerical solutions reveal whether decreasing the effort of curbside recycling
programs by implementation of single stream programs provide positive marginal net external
benefits.
The results can be summarized as follows. We find empirical evidence that diversion
of materials by consumers increases by 0.6%; however, recycling of materials only increases
by 0.4% due to contamination of the commingled material streams. In communities with
previously high diversion rates, single stream implementation could actually reduce the recy-
cling rate as a result of a large contamination effect. In a community with average recycling
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participation, however, the results show that conversion to single stream programs will gen-
erate external benefits of $29 per day per each 1% increase in single stream availability
in a MRF’s service region. Thus, municipalities interested in implementing single stream
programs should only spend an additional net cost of $29 to do so. At this level of policy
intervention, the net marginal cost of increasing single stream program availability would be
exactly offset by the marginal benefits provided.
4.1 Curbside Recycling Program Benefits
While recycling rates increase with the implementation of all curbside collection pro-
grams, this occurs at the expense of higher waste and recycling costs in comparison to
waste-only costs (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2003; Bohm et al., 2010).46
In fact, Kinnaman (2006) estimates that recycling programs have a net cost per ton that is
roughly twice that versus landfilling only; however, this estimate neglects any social benefits
that are provided from avoided upstream production externalities when recycled material
acts as a direct substitute for virgin material (Walls and Palmer, 2001; Acuff and Kaffine,
2012). Additionally, Aadland and Caplan (2006) examine CRPs to estimate the social net
benefits that they provide. Essentially, they weigh the social costs and benefits of curbside
programs and conclude that the social net benefits of curbside recycling are near zero. More-
over, they suggest that the costs of operating such programs outweigh the benefits from waste
reduction; however, the analysis again, does not consider the benefits of avoided upstream
production externalities. Previous research provided in Chapter 2 and 3 illustrates that
such upstream externalities are significant, indicating that the social benefits from curbside
recycling programs may be underestimated in the absence of these considerations.
The level of social benefits provided by various curbside recycling programs will depend
on the type of program implemented. In addition to determining participation, the type of
program will influence the residual of the diverted stream. High throughput single stream
46In a community with no CRP, private waste disposal costs are lower owing to a single hauler that picks
up all commingled garbage. In the presence of CRPs, costs increase in response to the additional costs of
added haulers and increased number of collection trips to collect separated recyclables.
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systems with recyclables that are commingled frequently translate to more broken glass,
higher moisture content, and an increase in the percentage of contaminated material that is
unrecoverable and must be down-cycled47 or landfilled.48 As a result, highly contaminated
waste streams are expected to provide less benefits, both privately and socially.
Examining the private benefits of recycling, Apotheker (1991) found that when recycling
was done by source separation of the municipal waste stream, the commingled stream gen-
erated lower revenue material when compared to materials that were initially separated by
the household at time of disposal. This was due to increased contamination in the com-
mingled material stream. Porter (2002) echoed this sentiment, by noting that the average
revenue of materials originating from single stream collection programs is lower than the av-
erage revenue of materials originating from source separated programs. For more regarding
the revenues from different stream types, see the appendix for a brief discussion on MRF
revenues from our sample population.
In addition to the private benefits of recycling and revenue generation from recovered
materials, the social benefits of recycling relate to the avoided externalities from waste re-
duction and material re-use. When materials are diverted from the waste stream and not
landfilled by the MRF, not only do they contribute to less landfill usage, but they also pro-
vide a source of low energy and low emissions secondary inputs for product manufacturing.
As such, social benefits are generated through both upstream and downstream channels, but
will only manifest when materials are both diverted and reused in new products. Thus, in
heavily contaminated diverted material streams, less benefits are provided if large quantities
of materials are uneconomic to clean and end up in landfills.
47Down-cycling refers to an open-loop recycling framework, where the material recycled is reused as a
lower quality material. This is in contrast to a closed-loop framework which assumes, for instance, that
when an aluminum can is recycled it is manufactured back into a can, maintaining the quality of the original
material.
48For instance, Morawski (2009) reports that only 40% of glass from single stream collection is recycled
into high quality application such as containers or fiberglass. An additional 20% is small broken glass that
can be down-cycled into low end uses, and the remaining 40% of the diversion stream eventually ends up
in landfills. In contrast, dual stream collections which separate glass, are reported to recycle 90% of the
materials as high use and little to nothing is landfilled. Lastly, diversion from a deposit/refund system yields
the highest quality streams where 98% of the materials is recovered for closed-loop recycling.
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This paper examines whether a municipality aiming to maximize external benefits should
adopt a single stream recycling program, when contamination of diverted material is ac-
counted for. In this context, the social benefits of recycling are not measured as synonymous
with those provided by the quantities of diverted materials, an important distinction when
contamination rates are significant. Thus, the analysis explicitly examines the role of single
stream programs on household recycling, referred to as waste diversion, in addition to the
role of single stream programs on the actual availability of recycled materials as secondary
inputs in manufacturing, referred to as recycling. The distinction between the two is depen-
dent on the contamination rates within the diverted material stream which will impact the
material quality and ultimately the quantities recycled. The key objective of the paper, is
to decompose the fundamental tension between the two opposing forces within single stream
curbside recycling programs, producing greater quantities of diverted materials at the ex-
pense of diminished quality. We explain the estimation model and data used in the analysis
next.
4.2 Estimation Model
The material being received at a MRF is used as a proxy to represent consumer diver-
sion behavior. We believe that this behavior, and the resulting reported quantities will be
driven by stream type. In order to capture the sole effect from stream types, we control
for additional influential variables - such as regional and demographic factors and MRF
characteristics. Specifically, we capture various observed influences in demographics, such
as income, population and community type, as well as unobserved variability among MRFs
and regions. Controlling for these factors, we can isolate the effect of single stream program
availability on diversion quantities and contamination rates. Central to the analysis then, is
to show whether and to what extent stream type will affect the quantities diverted and rate
of contamination.
Our objective is to estimate the marginal percentage change in the tons recycled, the
marginal change in contamination rate, and the marginal change in the tons diverted by
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consumers with a percentage increase in single stream programs in the community. A cross-
sectional regression model, using a log-log model specification is employed to estimate the
relationship between single stream and material recycling.
In particular, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
ri = α2i + λ1isi + λ2imi + λ3ihi + λ4ipi + λ5ili + λ6izi + ε2i (4.1)
where the quantity recycled, ri, by each MRF i is regressed against the percentage of single
stream programs servicing the MRF, si, the average annual household income for the county
where the MRF resides, mi, the percentage of the stream originating from residential areas
hi, the population serving the MRF, pi, and a regional fixed effect, li. In addition, several
control variables are used to address whether or not the MRF accepts glass, whether the
MRF is located in a bottle bill state, MRF technology levels, ownership type of the MRF,
and a regional fixed effect all represented by a matrix, zi.
Similarly, the quantity diverted by households, before accounting for contamination, is
represented in equation 4.2 as:
Qi = α1i + β1isi + β2imi + β3ihi + β4ipi + β5ili + β6izi + ε1i (4.2)
The same model set-up is used to estimate the relationship between single stream programs
and the quantity of materials diverted by households. From equations 4.1 and 4.2, the
coefficients of interest are λ1i and β1i which estimate the percentage change in the quantity
recycled and diverted with an increase in single stream programs, respectively. Thus, for
every percent increase of the presence of single stream within the MRF’s service community,
the percentage of material quantity recycled by MRFs and diverted by consumers will change
according to these estimates. We expect both coefficients to be positive, to reflect the effect of
single stream implementation on increasing the convenience for consumers to divert materials
from the waste stream.
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Meanwhile, the contamination rate and its relationship with single stream implementa-
tion plays a pivotal role in determining the difference between β1i and λ1i. The contamination
rate, γi is represented in equation 4.3 as:
γi = α3i + θ1isi + θ2iqi + θ3ipi + θ4izi + ε3i (4.3)
where we estimate the impact of single stream programs on the contamination rate of diverted
materials as θ1i. This coefficient represents the expected positive effect of single stream
implementation on contamination rates, decreasing the amount of material that is ultimately
recycled.
Several assumptions are made in the analysis. First, the model assumes that data from
MRFs are independent and not influenced by one another. This assumption could be violated
if owners of several MRFs report data from one facility and assume similar activity at an
additional facility and rollover information from one to another. Additionally, we assume
that single stream program presence is exogenous to the model. This assumption may be
violated when single stream programs are located in areas that already have high quantities
of waste being diverted. This could be true of municipalities in high diversion areas that
adopt such programs to cut down on collection costs at the curb. Although we acknowledge
that these assumptions could be violated in certain instances, in general, we believe that
they are not violated and thus will not affect the model results.
Lastly, we assume that the system of equations are contemporaneously correlated. Since
the quantity of material actually recycled is calculated using the first two dependent variables,
it is suspected that the error term for the third regression is correlated with those in the
first two regressions. To control for contemporaneous correlation among the error terms,
the estimation model utilizes a seemingly unrelated regression methodology, as suggested by
Henningsen and Hamann (2007). The data employed by the model is discussed next.
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4.3 Data
In order to model the relationship between single stream programs and recycling behavior,
we utilize observed data for diversion quantities and contamination rates provided by 437
material recovery facilities across the country during 2007 and 2008, as collected by Berenyi
(2008). In particular, the dataset reports the daily tons of each material type that is diverted
to the MRF by consumers, the contamination rate of materials processed at each MRF, the
percentage of the community that has single stream versus other stream programs, the
percentage of community that is residential, and population in the community being served.
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics across all 437 MRFs in the sample population for
each dependent variable, compared across collection stream types.
Although Table 4.1 provides the expected values for the dependent variables of interest
across different stream types, these average values fail to account for additional variable
influence. We use a mix of observable variables as well as a set of regional dummies that
capture unobservable differences across regions. As such, our estimation model accounts
for the impact of stream types while holding all other outside variation fixed. Thus, our
estimation results attempt to isolate the sole affect of single stream availability on recycling.
By controlling for various other effects, the model will eliminate omitted variable biases that
could contaminate the summary statistics information in Table 4.1.
Using this data, the study estimates changes in quantities diverted and recycled as a
result of changing the composition of stream-type entering the facility. The primary two
dependent variables that we are interested in comparing are the quantities of tons recycled
and tons diverted. The quantities recycled, however, are not reported, but rather values that
are calculated using the observed quantity diverted and observed contamination rate.
4.3.1 Dependent Variables
First, the quantity of material diverted by the consumers, Q, is reported in tons per
day. This quantity is used as a proxy to represent consumers’ tendencies to divert materials
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for all dependent variables differentiated by stream type -
single stream only, multi stream only, and all stream types.
Mean Median Std. Deviation Obs.
Tons Diverted (Q)
Single Streams 204.59 153 219.05 160
Dual/Multi Streams 95.47 42.46 135.01 277
All Streams 135.77 77.28 178.63 437
Tons Recycled (r)
Single Streams 183.58 131.88 204.97 160
Dual/Multi Streams 90.45 37.62 127.69 277
All Streams 124.84 71.04 166.58 437
% Contamination (γ)
Single Streams 11.29 10.00 7.69 160
Dual/Multi Streams 5.13 4.00 4.38 277
All Streams 7.5 5.00 6.53 437
From 437 MRFs in the data sample collected by Berenyi (2008).
from the waste stream. The tonnage represents the sum of the quantities across four main
diverted material types: fiber, plastic, metal, and glass.49 Within the sample, the average
quantity of diverted materials received at each MRF is 135 tons per day.
Second, the data reports the residual rate, γ, which is defined as the percentage of contam-
inated material that is uneconomic or unable to be resold and recycled. The contamination
of the material being received by the MRF is a large driver of how much material is actually
resold by the MRF and recycled by manufacturers. This contamination can occur for sev-
eral reasons, ranging from lack of consumer awareness of acceptable items to broken glass
and high moisture content within diversion streams. According to the sample, the average
residual rate of incoming materials is 7.5% as shown in Table 4.1. Meanwhile, the average
residual percentage for single stream is 11.29% and for all other stream type programs - such
as dual sort or source separated - the average residual is 5.13%. 50
49MRFs accepting fiber-only are not included since those are never fed by single stream programs. Those
MRFs that only accept fiber, plastic, and metal are included and represent the 62 facilities that do not
accept glass in the incoming stream.
50These values coincide with the estimates from Morawski (2012), who suggest that single stream programs
have a contamination rate between 10-15% while dual sort streams have a contamination rate close to 5-7%.
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Lastly, the quantity of material tons recovered each day for recycling by the material
recovery facility, r, is calculated by:
r = Q(1 − γ) (4.4)
using the observed values of Q and γ provided by the MRFs. Equation 4.4 shows that the
quantity of material recycled is always lower than the quantity diverted, owing to positive
(and non zero) contamination rates of incoming streams as shown in Table 4.1.51
4.3.2 Primary Control Variables
The quantity of materials recycled, quantity of materials diverted, and the rate of con-
tamination can be affected by several exogenous characteristics that are observed. The
explanatory variable of primary focus is the percentage of single stream programs servicing
the community. Single stream programs are thought to have a strong positive effect on
increasing all three dependent variables, Q, γ, and r. Thus, the regression model uses the
percentage of single stream programs in the MRF’s community to control for the quantity of
materials diverted, the quantity of material recycled, and the rate of contamination. Specif-
ically, the incoming diverted streams are produced by communities with the percentage of
single stream programs bounded between 0 and 100, si, and the percentage of other stream
type programs, 100 − si. Out of the 437 facilities in the data sample for 2008, 160 facilities
reported that they were currently receiving materials from single stream programs with an
additional 30 facilities that reported current conversion to single stream processing. Accord-
ing to Berenyi (2008), there is a strong trend towards facilities that can handle single stream
materials in response to the increase in single stream programs across the country.
Second, we assume that recycling behavior is influenced by household income, as sug-
gested by Tonjes and Swanson (1996). To account for this influence, county-level average
household income provided by The U.S. Census Bureau (2010) is used to explain the quan-
51Although we provide the summary statistics for the three dependent variables across stream types,
we do not believe that these average values are sufficient representations of the relationships between each
variable and stream type, since there is large variability among sample MRFs.
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tities diverted and recycled. Differences in income may account for differences in municipal
programs, public awareness programs, and education levels that are frequently driven by
local tax revenues.
Third, community population controls for the density and size of the MRF’s service area.
In addition, the population of the service area will correspondingly control for consumption
in the community and influence the quantity of materials diverted.
Next, the percentage of the community that is residential versus commercial is used
to control for diversion quantities and contamination rates. Commercial facilities tend to
provide more opportunities to recycle, such as co-locating recycling bins with trash bins.
Materials that are diverted by commercial entities tend to be of cleaner quality, with less
heterogeneity in the material types, which can ultimately decrease the sorting and clean-
ing required at the MRF. Approximately 58% of the sample population is classified as a
residential community in the data sample.
4.3.3 Other Control Variables
In addition, several other dummy and fixed effect control variables are used. First, we
specify whether or not the MRF accepts glass. Roughly 20% of MRFs do not accept material
streams that contain glass. MRFs can experience complications from broken glass resulting
in equipment damage, worker injuries, and customer dis-satisfaction due to the degradation
of materials causing reductions in sales. Glass products are frequently the cause of material
stream contamination. In particular, broken glass damages paper recycling equipment and
contributes to high costs for fiber recyclers. Broken bottles have a higher occurrence in the
instance of a single stream collection hauler. As a result, many single stream programs are
adopting policies to commingle all materials with the exception of glass items which are not
accepted.
Second, whether the state of the MRF location has an active bottle bill program is
included as a control variable. Bottle bills may potentially have competing effects on di-
version quantities. The first effect is a decrease in quantities that are collected by curbside
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programs if households return covered items to grocery stores or redemption centers for
refunds, cannibalizing the materials that would otherwise be received by a MRF through
curbside collection. This could potentially detract from the amount of high quality alu-
minum cans and clean beverage containers that are arriving at MRFs. On the other hand, a
bottle bill may have a positive effect on quantities diverted, in instances when such programs
enhance public outreach and recycling education, resulting in an increase in recycling, both
at redemption facilities and at the curb. To this end, the effect of a bottle bill program on
the quantity diverted is ambiguous.
Third, the firm’s operations may influence the capability of facilities to handle contam-
inated materials and the resulting output of material recycled. As a result, we control for
facility technology, which can vary across firms. The technology for processing recovered
materials at MRFs has changed quite a bit over recent years. Significant shifts have been
made towards updated sort lines with screening technology and optical sorters. In particular,
those MRFs that process materials from single stream collection have made large investments
on new capital equipment and capacity expansions. 52 Depending on the material stream
entering the MRF, the technology required to handle the material will vary. Single stream
material streams will need a high level of mechanized separation or a larger labor force.
Those MRFs only receiving materials that are already pre-sorted by material will require
very little equipment for separation. As such, the model designates the technology level as
being “high ” when the MRF uses mechanical sorting equipment in the form of an air classi-
fier, eddy current separator, or screen system. In contrast, those classified as “low” represent
MRFs that utilize simpler systems with balers, conveyors, and magnetic separators. Due to
the correlation in stream type and technology levels, we would expect some collinearity to
exist between these two control variables.
Fourth, the ownership of the firm may have an impact on the operations at each facility.
Ownership and control of MRFs is designated as being either private or public. Nearly 66%
52According to Berenyi (2008) roughly $205 Million has been spent on capital equipment upgrades across
the country since 2001.
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of all MRFs nationally are privately operated with the remainder being funded by various
federal, county, and municipal government programs or other non-profit entities. The man-
agement structure of facilities may provide information regarding the business operations of
different MRFs. For instance, publicly operated MRFs may have costs that exceed material
revenues, requiring subsidized operation. As a result, publicly operated collectors may serve
publicly owned MRFs which could have different pickup frequencies than private haulers,
resulting in different diversion quantities. For instance, weekly pickup frequencies may en-
courage consumers to divert more material versus an alternating weekly schedule, where
households may forget to put bins out for collection.
Lastly, diversion and recycling patterns may be largely influenced by regional character-
istics, such as the availability of local recycling programs, the level of “green-ness” within
the community, and other demographic factors. In addition, material recovery facilities can
be dominated by strong regional firms that have a large presence,53 potentially creating
regional-specific correlation between data samples. To account for regional influences not
captured in the control variables discussed above, a regional fixed effect is used to control
for any remaining regional considerations.
4.4 Regression Estimates
The model empirically estimates the marginal impact of single stream programs on the
quantities recycled and diverted, r and Q, respectively, along with the impact on the con-
tamination rate of diverted material streams, γ. First, Table 4.2 shows the estimation
results for the quantity of recycled material. The marginal effect of single stream programs
presence on the quantity recycled is around a 0.40% increase, with a range of coefficients
between 0.30% - 0.50% across all SUR model specifications. These coefficient estimates are
all highly statistically significant. This coefficient estimate suggests that increasing single
stream availability in a community by 1% will increase the quantity of material recycled by
53For instance, Far West Fibers in the West and Resource Management in the Midwest are regionally
dominant firms.
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about 0.54 tons, relative to a typical MRF recycling 124 tons each day.
Table 4.2: Percent quantity recycled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) -19.897*** -20.158*** -19.613*** -18.169*** -19.618***
(2.305) (2.368) (2.500) (2.225) (2.502)
Single Stream (%) 0.333** 0.472*** 0.474*** 0.365** 0.403***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.131) (0.124) (0.112)
log(Population) 0.667*** 0.712*** 0.742*** 0.676*** 0.739***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
log(County Income) 1.448*** 1.445*** 1.383 *** 1.268*** 1.345***
(0.222) (0.229) (0.243) (0.217) (0.235)
Residential (%) -0.703*** -1.109*** -1.073*** -0.876*** -1.09***
(0.200) (0.205) (0.210) (0.201) (0.205)
Glass 0.377** 0.328* 0.376** 0.361*
(0.132) (0.137) (0.128) (0.132)
High Technology 0.040
(0.030)




Regional Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.661 0.645 0.652 0.677 0.651
N 326 326 326 326 326
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significant codes: 0 ’***’, 0.001 ’**’, 0.01 ’*’, 0.05 ’.’, and 0.1 ’ ’
Next, Table 4.3 shows the regression results for the quantity diverted. The results
show that in the absence of contamination considerations, the quantity of material diverted
by consumers is positively affected by single stream programs. Specifically, the regression
estimates indicate that for each 1% increase in single stream programs in a MRF service
region, there is roughly a 0.60% increase in the quantity of materials diverted. This translates
to an additional 0.82 tons, relative to the sample mean MRF receiving 136 tons each day.
The notable result from both Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 is that for each model specification, 1-
5, we see that the difference between the coefficients for the marginal impact of single stream
programs on recycling and diversion quantities range between 0.001 - 0.002. For example, in
model 1, the marginal impact on recycling is 0.3% and the marginal impact on diversion is
73
Table 4.3: Percent quantity diverted
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) -19.892*** -20.177*** -19.615*** -18.377*** -19.612***
(2.304) (2.367) (2.498) (2.289) (2.500)
Single Stream (%) 0.520*** 0.653*** 0.634*** 0.541*** 0.602***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.132) (0.129) (0.113)
log(Population) 0.669*** 0.717*** 0.745 *** 0.686*** 0.723***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041)
log(County Income) 1.445*** 1.443*** 1.382 *** 1.279*** 1.343***
(0.222) (0.229) (0.243) (0.223) (0.205)
Residential (%) -0.633** -1.074*** -1.030*** -0.824*** -1.051***
(0.200) (0.206) (0.211) (0.208) (0.205)
Glass 0.393** 0.328* 0.377** 0.360*
(0.132) (0.137) (0.133) (0.132)
Bottle Bill 0.099
(0.152)
Private Ownership 0.504*** 0.522***
(0.115) (0.112)
Regional Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.668 0.652 0.658 0.681 0.657
N 326 326 326 326 326
Table 4.4: Contamination rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) -0.015 -0.030 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.033)
Single Stream (%) 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
log(Population) 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Residential (%) 0.061*** 0.031* 0.037** 0.039** 0.043**
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Glass 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.009)






Regional Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.261 0.277 0.299 0.298 0.296
N 326 326 326 326 326
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0.5%. moreover, in model 2 and 3, the marginal impacts on recycling and diversion are 0.4%
and 0.6% respectively. This suggests that regardless of the exact model coefficients used, the
results hold across all specifications. Thus, we can assume with considerable confidence that
diversion and recycling quantities do diverge significantly, with a 30% to 60% difference due
to material contamination loss.
Lastly, the model examines how the contamination rate is affected by our control vari-
ables. Table 4.4 shows the estimated coefficients for the contamination rate of diverted
waste. The results shows that the contamination rate increases by a level 0.07 with each 1%
increase in single stream programs in the community. This represents roughly a 1% growth
in the contamination rate with a 1% increase in single stream for the sample mean material
contamination rate near 7%.
Overall, the regression results suggest that there is a strong positive relationship between
single stream programs and consumer’s diversion tendencies and between single stream pro-
grams and manufacturer recycling. The estimates obtained suggest that using the quantity
diverted as a measure for the quantity recycled may be upwardly biased in overstating the
benefits of single stream recycling programs. If policymakers fail to account for the material
loss that occurs as a result of increased contamination with these programs, the benefits of
single stream program implementation may be inflated between 30% - 60%. Next, we take a
closer look at the mechanics of how contamination contributes to reductions in the quantity
of material recycled, by decomposing the two effects of contamination on diverted material.
4.4.1 Effects from Contamination
Now, we examine the difference between the effect of single stream program implemen-
tation on diversion quantities and the effect of single stream program implementation on
recycled quantities and the channels contributing to the difference discussed above. The
quantity of material available for recycling will be dependent on both the quantity diverted
and the percentage of the material that is contaminated. Recalling the relationship between
the recycled quantities and both variables from equation 4.4, we can represent the difference
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where we can see that there are two channels of contamination that contribute to this
difference. The first effect, γ dQ
ds
, is the negative diversion effect from the increase in in the
quantity of materials contaminated as the quantity diverted increases. The second effect,
Qdγ
ds
, is the contamination effect from an increase in the contamination rate as single stream
increases.
Since γ is the contamination rate and will always be less than one, we know that the
negative diversion effect will always be less than the positive diversion effect on the left
hand side. Thus, we are only concerned with an increasingly large contamination effect,
outweighing the positive diversion effect. Further calculation shows us that as the quantity
of material diverted increases, this contamination effect becomes greater, potentially out-
weighing any benefits from increased positive diversion. Using the estimate results, we fix
the marginal change in diversion quantities, dQ
ds
= 0.81 tons, allowing us to find the point at
which increasing single stream availability will provide zero or negative returns to recycling.
This exercise tells us that at MRFs already receiving diversion quantities around 1,060 tons,
further single stream implementation may lead to reductions in the total quantity of material
recycled. This is attributed to the fact that an increase in contamination of that quantity of










where the benefits from an increase in diversion with single stream availability, are out-
weighed by the costs from an increase in both the contamination effect and negative diversion
effect. This helps us to understand the key driver behind material loss with contamination of
single stream programs. Next, we examine the social benefits of the recycled material stream
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in the data sample to determine the optimal level of single stream program implementation
using the results.
4.5 External Benefits
Recycling of post-consumer items provides two types of external benefits. The first
relates to the decreased landfill usage and thus avoided external costs of landfill disposal.
The second benefit relates to the availability of recycled material in upstream production
activity, allowing producers to substitute away from energy and emissions intensive virgin
materials. The second social benefit has the potential to generate large emissions savings
depending on the material type as discussed in Chapter 3, that far exceed the benefits of
avoided landfill disposal. These benefits, however, are only realized if there is a demand for
the recycled material. This may not be the case for low quality secondary materials, which
have lower demand from manufacturers and are frequently uneconomic to process.
In the case of material down-cycling, when materials enter an “open loop” where they
are recycled into different products, typically characterized by lower grade quality, the new
product is frequently one that may not be recycled as freely or commonly as the original
product. For instance, plastic bottles can be down-cycled into polyester clothing. While
plastic bottles have a relatively short life cycle and are easy for consumers to recycle, clothing
typically has a much longer life span and the plastic is less available for future recycling in
the textile form. Thus, down-cycling can potentially diminish the social benefits of material
recycling, by decreasing the pool of available high grade secondary material.
From the results we expect the quantity diverted and recycled to increase with single
stream. With this relationship, we can examine the magnitude of the external benefits
generated by increasing single stream programs. As shown in Chapter 3, the social benefits
of recycling are largely driven by material-specific characteristics. Thus, we examine the
average material make-up of diversion streams received by the sample MRFs.
Table 4.5 shows a breakdown of the emissions reduction benefits for the four material
types and their share within the average ton processed in the MRF sample. The first column
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Table 4.5: Emissions savings and resulting benefits per ton of average material stream pro-
cessed at a MRF
Material Share of Avg. (δv − δr) Avg. Emissions Benefit Share of
(%/ton) (MTCO2e/ton) (MTCO2e/ton) ($/ton) Ben. (%/ton)
Fiber 72.5 0.17 0.123 6.16 13
Plastic 6.6 1.47 0.097 4.85 10
Metal 9.3 7.67 0.713 35.67 74
Glass 11.6 0.29 0.034 1.68 3
Total 100 0.967 48.36 100
The average material stream recycled is roughly 124 tons. The average makeup of diverted material is shown in
column 1. The emissions savings for one ton of each material type recycled is shown in column two. Column three
is the product of columns one and two to represent the average emissions savings for each material per average ton
received at MRFs. The social benefit from emissions savings per average ton, shown in fourth column, is calculated
using a social cost of emissions of $50 per MTCO2E.
of numerical data shows the average percentage of each material by weight in the waste
diversion stream. Fiber has the largest share from the sample MRFs, with an average of 72%
of the material being received.54 Next, glass has the second largest share with close to 12%
of the material stream diverted. Metal and plastic have the least largest shares, representing
only 9% and 7% of the diversion stream tonnage respectively. This is in direct contrast to
the amount of greenhouse gas emissions savings provided by recycling each material, where
metals and plastic offer the greatest emissions reductions benefits as shown in the column
labeled (δv − δr).
The emissions reduction that are provided by recycling each material as a share of an
average ton are shown next in the third column of Table 4.5. The fourth column expresses
these values in terms of the dollar benefits each material contributes when one average ton
is recycled. The material types within the average stream that provide the greatest external
benefits from emissions reductions are metal - by nearly sixfold - followed by fiber and plastic.
Glass provides the smallest share of benefits. The rightmost column shows the percentage
share of total benefits provided by each material in the average stream by recycling. Metal,
only comprising around 9% of the material stream by weight represents 74% of the emissions
54Again, this sample does not include MRFs that only receive fiber.
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reductions benefits, followed by plastic with a 10% share of the total external benefits per
ton.
The unpriced external benefits represent the externalities that are avoided as a result
of recycling products at the end of their useful life. Such externalities include the avoided
unpriced emissions from virgin material production and avoided dis-amenities of landfill
disposal. The upstream emissions divergences between recycled and virgin materials is ac-
counted for using (δv−δr). This difference represents the emissions savings from substitution
of recycled inputs for virgin inputs and is measured in metric tons CO2-equivalent per ton of
material. The social cost of greenhouse gas emissions in $/MTCO2e is then denoted by Λg
and is used to calculate the marginal benefit of recycling due to avoided upstream emissions,
which is represented by the first term in equation 4.7. Similarly, to account for the avoided
downstream waste disposal externalities, the social cost of landfilling per ton of material that
avoids landfill disposal, Λw is multiplied by the quantity of material diverted and recycled,
r.55 Thus, the total benefit in ($) to the community from the avoided externalities from
recycling is shown by:
X = Λg(δv − δr)r + Λw (4.7)
With an average of 124 tons of materials processed at each MRF, the average external
benefits from recycling materials at each facility can be calculated using equation 4.7. Using
a social cost of landfilling, Λw of $10 per ton and a social cost of emissions, Λg of $50 per
MTCO2e,
56 the total social benefits of recycling 124 tons is calculated to generate an average
of $7,237 in avoided external costs. This equates to an estimate of $58.36 in external benefits
per average ton recycled. With a 1% increase in single stream programs, the results suggest
that the average MRF would increase the quantity of materials available for recycling by
55The social costs of landfilling include the external costs or dis-amenities generated by landfills such as
noise, traffic, odor, and methane emissions that are not internalized by tipping fees or other private disposal
costs. The estimates for the social cost of waste are anywhere roughly between $5-30 per ton disposed as
discussed by Kinnaman (2006) and Palmer et al. (1997).
56This value roughly represents a mid to high estimated social cost of carbon provided by the Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (see http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf).
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0.4% which equates to an additional 1
2
ton. Thus, the external marginal benefits of converting
to single stream are $29 per additional 1% of single stream presence in a community.
For the sample population of 437 MRFs, this would equate to an additional $12,673
in external benefits from reduced waste and GHG emissions each day for a 1% increase in
single stream across all 437 communities. This estimation, however, could be overestimated
if MRF service regions overlap, in which case a 1% increase in single stream availability
would generate less benefits to each MRF since our model assumes that each MRF has its
own service region.
4.6 Conclusions
Several cities have recently decided to “un-mingle” their recycling programs, returning to
a traditional sort or dual stream program. Such has been the case in cities across Canada and
the United Kingdom in 2011. In the meantime, MRFs within the United States are switching
to new technologies to process single stream materials. Many controversies surround the
debate over single versus multi stream collection programs. Municipalities across the county
are weighing the options of single stream programs, tauting it as a contributing factor to
increased material re-collection and recycling. Quantifying the change in materials recycled
with the change in consumer effort to divert material, however, will provide policymakers
with an understanding of whether single stream programs provide positive net social benefits
to the community.
This paper examines the external benefits from increasing single stream curbside collec-
tion program presence. Specifically, the social benefits from recycling are twofold. First,
waste is diverted from landfills, reducing the external costs of landfill usage. Second, mate-
rials are available as inputs in manufacturing of new products, reducing the need for virgin
material inputs which are frequently larger sources of external damages - either through en-
ergy requirements or acquisition activities. These benefits, both upstream and downstream,
are not realized unless the material is diverted and re-used as an input in manufacturing at
a later time. A common misinterpretation of municipal solid waste recycling is that all items
80
diverted are recycled, yet as this paper shows, this is not necessarily true.
Results from the current study suggest that such programs may provide external benefits,
however, the reported benefits may be overstated if diversion quantities are mistaken as
recycled quantities. While diversion of material does increase with the adoption of single
stream programs, there is less of an increase of material that is recycled by manufacturers.
This manifests due to the fact that single stream collection programs tend to increase the
contamination of materials. The materials that are contaminated are ultimately either down-
cycled or landfilled, detracting or negating the social benefits of material diversion.
In particular, diverted items will only be recycled if it is economically beneficial to do so
and there is a demand for the materials in secondary markets. While this may still be true
for high quality products that are recycled in a “closed-loop”, industry suggests that this is
not the case for contaminated material streams. According to Morawski (2009), low quality
materials are predicted to be squeezed out of the secondary market in the near future, as a
result of high cleaning and processing costs.
Moreover, highly contaminated single stream recycling programs emerged in the 2000’s at
a time when emerging markets in developing nations, especially China, had strong demand
for diverted material streams. These markets were interested in purchasing high volumes
of secondary material, regardless of the residual rates, due to the fact that they could use
low income workers to further separate and clean contaminated material. The longevity of
this demand for low quality materials, however, may not last. Facilities that process single
stream materials may find it increasingly difficult to market the material to producers that
face higher processing costs. Meanwhile, there still appears to be growth in single stream
recycling programs, which are driven by municipalities seeking low cost collection methods.
For municipalities seeking to adopt recycling policies that will maximize the social benefits
from recycling, it is essential to examine not just what is diverted by consumers but what
is actually recycled and used as an input in production. When recycling policies are based
solely on the reported collection rates without accounting for residual rates, policy decisions
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may be biased, as collection rates tend to be inflated by 30%-60% in comparison to recycling
rates. In particular, an increase in single stream programs in a community by 1% will
increase the quantity diverted each day by 4
5
of a ton on average. After accounting for
contamination, this translates to an increase in the quantity available for recycling of only 1
2
of a ton daily per MRF. The data examined in this study suggests that contamination rates
could potentially trump the increase in material diversion in instances of high single stream
program concentration. This result manifests from the fact that the contamination effect
has a large impact on decreasing the positive effect of single stream programs on recycling
quantities.
Additionally, the average material stream composition of both single stream and multi
stream materials, do not generate the largest external benefits. This is due to the fact that
the types of materials that dominate waste stream are paper and glass, which provide the
least benefits via emissions reductions in upstream production activities. The results here
show that policy can only justify implementing single stream programs to the point that
intervention costs $58 per additional ton recycled. It is suspected that greater intervention
levels may be justified if municipalities implement programs that target collection of specific
materials such as metal and plastic products only, but future analysis would be necessary
to analyze how single stream programs affect collection of different product types. Policy-
makers seeking to increase the external benefits of such programs could limit the collected
material types to focus more heavily on products that provide greater emissions reductions




Traditionally, recycling policy was viewed as a method to reduce waste going to landfills.
The research in this dissertation, however, provides a new perspective, one in which recycling
is viewed as a means to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emission externali-
ties. We show how policy can be used to account for the total benefits from recycling - to
appropriately justify policy implementation from a social perspective. The results show that
greater recycling policy intervention is justified once greenhouse gas emissions are consid-
ered, and highlight the importance of policies that encourage recycling of specific materials
and that account for contamination of diverted materials. These recommendations can guide
policymakers implementing recycling programs in order to maximize social benefits.
First, we re-evaluate recycling policies in light of the emissions savings benefits that they
generate. In the absence of a nationally implemented carbon pricing scheme, alternative
policies may be utilized to address unpriced greenhouse gas emissions externalities. For in-
stance, Chapter 2 investigates second-best waste reduction and recycling policies to address
emissions externalities generated from material manufacturing. In instances when upstream
production emissions damages are disregarded, recycling policies have little to no justifica-
tion; however after accounting for upstream greenhouse gas emissions externalities, policy
intervention, such as a deposit/refund or product disposal fee, is significantly justified. In
many instances, upstream greenhouse gas emissions considerations are equally or more im-
portant than waste reduction considerations. Previous literature on recycling significantly
under-valued the total benefits provided by recycling. Thus, policy intervention to address
upstream production externalities is justified to a much larger degree than intervention to
address waste disposal externalities.
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To account for these emissions externalities, we analyze three policy instruments which
encourage recycling behavior and/or discourages consumption. Both of these mechanisms
help to reduce greenhouse emissions in production of consumer goods, either by increasing the
use of less emissions intensive recycled materials or by decreasing total production activities.
The source reduction channel, which relates to a reduction in consumption, provides greater
savings for most materials, by reducing total production, and thus emissions. The increased
recycling channel, which relates to consumers having a higher tendency to recycle, only
provides incremental emissions savings for each material. The main findings show that a
deposit/refund type policy - similar to a bottle bill - will provide the greatest net benefits
by both increasing recycling rates of consumers and decreasing consumption. The least
favorable policy is one that subsidizes recycling. This type of policy encourages recycling
at the same time that it encourages consumption, since the price that the consumer pays is
ultimately lower. In some instances, this can lead to a net increase in total emissions, when
production emissions increases outweigh the savings from increased recycling.
This study also finds that a modest cost-savings is achieved when policy instrument levels
are allowed to vary by material. Substantial variation in the optimal instrument level across
materials is also found, highlighting the large disparity in emissions savings among materials.
Correspondingly, the least-cost policy approach would implement an instrument that would
vary among materials.
As a result of the variation in benefits from recycling different materials, we examine the
optimal change in recycling rates across various materials. Chapter 3 shows that recycling
rates are directly dependent on material-specific characteristics, such as elasticities and prices
in the secondary market. In addition, material-specific recycling policies provide the greatest
social benefits since there is significant heterogeneity in emissions across material types.
Thus, justification for recycling policy intervention is determined by both the private market
for each material and its external damages, highlighting the importance of material-specific
analyses on two grounds.
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Specifically, the results indicate that significant increases to the current recycling rates
are justified for aluminum, steel, and office paper only. In contrast, current state-mandated
recycling rate targets encompass total MSW, to encourage recycling of all materials within
the waste stream. These policy goals could mistakenly lead to increased recycling of materials
that provide little benefit, such as glass and newspaper. As a result, municipality recycling
programs will maximize social benefits by increasing efforts that focus on increasing recycling
rates of target materials within the MSW stream, as identified in this study.
In light of this finding, non material-specific recycling policies are still very common across
the U.S., and their presence is growing. The most common non material-specific recycling
policies are single stream collection programs. These programs not only fail to target key
materials, but also contribute to higher contamination of diverted material streams. Despite
the two principle weaknesses of single stream programs, Chapter 4 shows that these recycling
policies do provide positive net marginal external benefits from increased recycling. Empir-
ical estimates reveal that decreasing the effort required to participate in curbside recycling
programs provides positive marginal external benefits of a magnitude of roughly $12,673 each
day with a 1% increase in single stream collection programs across the sample population.
Implementation of these aggregate material collection policies is justified to a small degree
- with intervention costs of no more than $12,673 each day across all communities - while
larger intervention levels are certainly justified for material-specific programs. In addition,
this analysis indicates that these benefits may be significantly over-stated by 30% - 60% in
many instances, when policymakers fail to account for contamination rates.
With implementation of single stream programs, there are two channels of material con-
tamination that contribute to a reduction in the quantity of material recycled. The first
channel is the increase in quantity diverted as single stream availability increases. As more
material is diverted, there is necessarily more material that will be contaminated. The sec-
ond channel relates to the increase in the contamination rate in single stream programs. This
channel has roughly twice the impact on decreasing recycled materials as the effect from the
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first channel. This finding suggests that at very high diversion quantities, single stream im-
plementation may not generate any additional recycled material. We show that at diversion
quantities above 1,060 tons of the average mix of waste, no additional recycled material is
generated. In fact, any quantity above this amount will lead to a decline in the quantity of
material recycled with an increase in single stream programs. As a result of contamination,
single stream programs will provide greater benefits in instances when communities have
low diversion tendencies. Despite the evidence of benefits from material-specific policies,
single stream curbside recycling may still provide positive external benefits, by increasing
the convenience for households to recycle.
Essential to all policy intervention is to outline the key objectives of such policies, such
as maximizing the social net benefits in a community. These results combined can help
municipalities consider the external benefits of recycling policy adoption to better understand
whether and to what degree policy intervention is justified.
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APPENDIX A - GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS DATA SOURCES AND
ASSUMPTIONS
The data used in the current study was obtained from“Solid Waste Management and
Greenhouse Gases: A Life-Cycle Assessment of Emissions and Sinks” an analysis conducted
by the EPA in 2002. The EPA estimated the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from fossil
fuel combustion during the acquisition, manufacturing and transportation of raw materials
into manufactured goods. All energy data originated from the EPA’s Office of Research
and Development (ORD) and from Franklin Associates Ltd. (FAL). The report was created
to highlight the greenhouse gas emissions implications of solid waste policy decisions. The
degree to which greenhouse gas emissions from various waste materials differ determines the
impact of alternative waste and recycling policies across material type.
There were four greenhouse gas emissions estimates made for each material, representing
the process energy and transportation energy for materials made from either 100% virgin
or 100% recycled inputs. Exceptions were made for steel cans and corrugated box which
assume 20% and 14.7% minimum recycled contents respectively.
A.1 Emissions from process energy
Energy required for acquisition and manufacturing of raw materials is denoted as process
energy, with emissions primarily consisting of CO2. Specifically, the CO2 emissions from
combustion of fuels for mining activities and from generation of electricity for manufacturing
activities were calculated in the process energy emissions. Process energy emissions also
include those generated from activities involved in oil exploration and extraction, coal mining,
natural gas production, and other precombustion activities requiring energy. In addition to
CO2 considerations, total process emissions from raw material acquisition and manufacturing
also include CH4 emissions associated with producing, processing, and transporting of coal,
oil, and natural gas.
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A.2 Emissions from transportation energy
Transportation data was obtained using the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics Com-
modity Flow Survey which reported the average distance commodities are shipped as well as
the breakdown of transportation modes used within the country. Transportation emissions
were added to both virgin and recycled materials. In the case of emissions reduction from
transportation, source reduction of materials would have a more significant impact than in-
creased recycling, reflecting the similar energy requirements for transportation of both virgin
and recycled materials.
Greenhouse gas emissions from transportation activities were calculated as the CO2 emis-
sions from the combustion of fuels used to transport raw materials to the final manufacturing
facilities. For recycled materials, transportation from curbside to the materials recovery fa-
cility (MRF), from MRF to broker, and from broker to final manufacturing facility was
computed. Additionally, the transportation emissions values for recycled materials include
the energy used to process inputs at the MRF. For both material types, emissions from
transportation of the final good from the manufacturer to the retailer was included and the
transportation to consumers was excluded. Emissions values of CH4 or N2O, however, were
not included in the transportation calculations as these emissions are assumed to be signifi-
cantly smaller in magnitude than the CO2 values produced by transportation activities. The
last assumption results in a slight understatement of the total greenhouse gas emissions and
of the share of emissions from transportation activities.
A.3 Energy requirement assumptions
For the energy requirements for each material, both the ORD and FAL data sets were
created using published engineering and production data in addition to industry experts and
trade organizations. All known energy consumption in the production processes, whether
used abroad or in the United States, was incorporated in the data. For instance, the energy
required for mining and processing bauxite overseas for the production of aluminum was
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included.
The energy requirements in the analysis assume that materials undergo closed loop recy-
cling, where primary materials are recycled into the same material. In reality, some materials
are not re-manufactured into the same material type and thus would require an open loop.
Such open loop life cycles are commonly observed for mixed paper, cardboard, carpet, and
computers. For plastics, recycled materials were given a single energy profile because recy-
cling processes for HDPE, LDPE, and PET are similar. For steel can production, the EPA
made estimates for greenhouse gas emissions from virgin production using a basic oxygen
process and from recycled production using an electric arc furnace process.
To estimate the emissions from electricity, the EPA used a national average mix of fuels
which may vary regionally. It is important to note that many consumer products are increas-
ingly originating from international sources where the fuel mixes and energy requirements
may differ significantly. Similarly, different manufacturers within the US will have different
processes with varied energy requirements and efficiency profiles.
A.4 Carbon coefficient assumptions
EPA used the carbon coefficients provided by the Depart of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration for all energy sources with exception of electricity. The carbon coefficients
used included the CO2 emissions generated from fuel combustion. To elaborate on these
values, the EPA added the average CH4 emitted from the production, processing, and trans-
portation of fossil fuels and the CO2 emitted from oil production and flaring of natural gas.
The resulting values were used as the average greenhouse gas emissions related to produc-
tion of coal, oil, and natural gas. The coefficient for electricity was calculated as a weighted
average of the national mix of fuel usage. For the carbon coefficient of electricity, the EPA
used data calculated by the FAL that already incorporated the efficiency of converting each
fuel to electricity and the corresponding loss in transmission and distribution of electricity.
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A.5 Limitations to emissions data
The EPA believes that these average emissions values provide a good approximation
of the actual greenhouse gas emissions; however, it must be noted that these are averages
and not marginal emissions. These values do not represent the marginal emissions rate per
incremental ton of material produced. It may be the case for some materials that the marginal
emissions may differ significantly from the averages used here. Moreover, the relationship
between recycling and greenhouse gas emissions may be non-linear, such that reducing the
production of a material from virgin inputs may not result in a proportional decrease in the
greenhouse gas emissions. This suggests that as recycling rates increase, emissions reductions
may occur at a declining rate. Greenhouse gas emissions from production and transportation
of materials may shift in a nonlinear fashion if capacity constraints, scale economies, or other
factors exist. In the case of electricity a long-term decline in the demand for electricity may
reduce demand for specific fuels and not an overall reduction in all fuels in proportion to
their share within the average fuel mix. Nonetheless, the average carbon coefficients are used
primarily because the marginal rates would be difficult to estimate.
Additionally, national averages for electricity generations are general representations of
emissions. A more specific regional analysis would be required in order to more accurately
capture the effect of the local fuel mix on overall emissions from electricity.
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APPENDIX B - STATE-LEVEL RECYCLING RATE TARGETS

















APPENDIX C - NET PRIVATE COSTS OF SINGLE STREAM RECYCLING
PROGRAMS
The private net benefits for a sample of MRFs is shown in Table C.1. Within the MRF
sample population, the average revenue per ton received at each facility is $19,428 and the
average cost per ton to process materials is $27,878, indicating roughly an average -$8,450
deficit per ton processed. Furthermore, the median net benefits represent a loss as well,
although only of around -$1,635. The revenue statistics were calculated using a sample of
136 reporting MRFs, while the cost data was available for only 91 MRFs. Both the annual
revenue and annual cost data was reported by the subsamples for random years between
2004 and 2008. As a result, there may be a large sampling error in these data values due
to changes in material market prices and secondary market dynamics. 57 Interestingly, the
only subsample of the sample data which shows positive net private benefits are the MRFs
processing single stream material. Although the average net benefits are negative at around
-$5,920, the median net value is a positive $3,674. This does suggest that MRFs with single
stream program providers have higher material revenues, offsetting the facilities costs. It
may be that the costs of processing single stream material increase less than the revenues
generated by such programs. Future research might examine how single stream curbside
programs affect the net revenues of material recovery facilities, in order to elaborate on the
concept of down-cycling and to isolate the change in the quality of materials.
57For instance, the statistics show that the expected revenue for single stream materials is actually higher
than that expected for multi stream materials. This result is counterintuitive since we would expect material
streams to be more contaminated and sell for a lower price, and thus we believe these sample values may
not be representative of true values.
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Table C.1: Revenue and Cost Statistics for Reporting MRFs
Revenue/Ton ($) Cost/Ton ($) Net
All Streams
Average 19,428 27,878 -8,450
Median 19,218 20,852 -1,635
Standard Deviation 11,818 25,896
Single Stream
Average 23,580 29,500 -5,920
Median 24,526 20,852 3,674
Standard Deviation 14,040 21,788
Other Stream
Average 17,934 27,329 -9,395
Median 18,478 20,952 -2,474
Standard Deviation 10,595 27,271
Sample Size 136 91
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